[There is substantial evidence that insider trading is present around corporate announcements and that this insider trading is motivated by private information. Using real estate investment trusts that choose to reappraise themselves as our sample, we establish that the appraisals contain information, but find no market response to the public announcement of this information in these appraisals. We consider two possible explanations for this inconsistency: the first that the appraisal information is not highlighted in earnings reports and hence remains unobserved; and the second that insiders trade on the appraisal information in the time that elapses between the appraisal and its public announcement. We find strong support for the second hypothesis, with insiders buying (selling) after they receive favorable (unfavorable) appraisal news, especially for negative appraisals. We also find that positive (negative) appraisals and net insider buying (selling) elicit significant positive (negative) abnormal returns during the appraisal period.]

There is substantial evidence that insider trading is present around corporate announcements and that this insider trading is motivated by private information. Using real estate investment trusts that choose to reappraise themselves as our sample, we establish that the appraisals contain information, but find no market response to the public announcement of this information in these appraisals. We consider two possible explanations for this inconsistency: the first that the appraisal information is not highlighted in earnings reports and hence remains unobserved; and the second that insiders trade on the appraisal information in the time that elapses between the appraisal and its public announcement. We find strong support for the second hypothesis, with insiders buying (selling) after they receive favorable (unfavorable) appraisal news, especially for negative appraisals. We also find that positive (negative) appraisals and net insider buying (selling) elicit significant positive (negative) abnormal returns during the appraisal period.

Abstract This paper shows novel evidence on the mechanism through which financial constraints amplify fluctuations in asset prices and credit demand. It does so using contractual features of housing finance. Among agents whose housing demand is constrained by the availability of collateral, those who can borrow against a larger fraction of their housing value (achieve a higher loan-tovalue, or LTV, ratio) have more procyclical debt capacity. This procyclicality underlies the financial accelerator mechanism. Our study uses international variation in LTV ratios over three decades to test whether (a) housing prices and (b) demand for new mortgage borrowings are more sensitive to income shocks in countries where households can achieve higher LTV ratios. The results we obtain are consistent with the dynamics of a collateral-based financial accelerator in international housing markets.

Jarl G. Kallberg, Crocker L. Liu, Charles Trzcinka, The Value Added from Investment Managers: An Examination of Funds of REITs, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Sep., 2000), pp. 387-408

We examine the over-investment motivation for share repurchases using a sample of 139 Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) between 1996 and 2010. By combining a REIT's property portfolio data with project ROAs from the underlying real estate market, we are able to create a unique measure of the firm's investment opportunity set. Controlling for other possible buyback rationales, we find that poor investment opportunities are related to higher levels of share repurchases. Conditioning on investment opportunities, we find that the level of cash is positively related to repurchases only for low investment opportunity set firms. We also find a negative relationship between share repurchase announcement returns and investment opportunities.

This study analyzes the reactions of equity holders and bondholders to the announcement of 427 preferred stock issues. We document an average equity announcement effect of −0.65%. This reaction is positively influenced by a number of measures of firm creditworthiness and transparency and is higher for bank issuers. The equity market reaction is negatively influenced by convertibility (and the moneyness of the embedded option) and by the firm's accounting treatment of the issue (specifically if the issue is classified as equity). We find that average credit default swap spreads decrease by 50 basis points after the issue announcement. This decrease is also larger for more creditworthy and transparent firms. Convertibility and the moneyness of the embedded option further decrease the CDS spread. In aggregate, the decrease in equity value is much smaller than the increase in the value of the issuer's debt.

We formulate and test several hypotheses on managerial motivation using organizational form changes in the real estate industry. We find that firms that switch to a more restrictive structure have increases in stock value and managerial ownership. Firms moving to a less restrictive structure have larger wealth effects when higher monitoring exists. Higher degree of financial distress and forced CEO replacement at the time of organizational form change are taken to be proxies for higher degree of (creditor) monitoring. The wealth effects are decreasing in the firm's level of free cash flow at the time of organizational form change.

We find evidence that conflicts of interest are pervasive in the asset management business owned by investment banks. Using data from 1990 to 2008, we compare the alphas of mutual funds, hedge funds, and institutional funds operated by investment banks and non-bank conglomerates. We find that, while no difference exists in performance by fund type, being owned by an investment bank reduces alphas by 46 basis points per year in our baseline model. Making lead loans increases alphas, but the dispersion of fees across portfolios decreases alphas. The economic loss is $4.9 billion per year.

We study changes in the real estate industry among organizational forms with varying degrees of restrictiveness and document the associated changes in profitability, free cash flow, debt, dividends, and investment policies. All troubled firms in our sample move to a more flexible organizational structure, with subsequent reductions in dividends, improvements in performance, and increases in asset sales and investments. Healthy firms that move to a tighter structure have larger free cash flows before the change; they increase dividends, reduce free cash flows and improve profitability after the change. We document evidence of tax considerations in organizational changes.

Abstract This paper analyzes the optimal quality decision of a producer in a multi-period setting with reputation effects. Using a unique database of returns on real estate limited partnerships (RELPs), we empirically examine alternative theoretical predictions of optimal producer strategy. In particular, we test whether the producers in our market invest in reputation building by initially selling high quality goods and then lowering quality. Using a variety of statistical tests, we find evidence consistent with reputation building, both in the aggregate and for individual developers.