Journal Article A Note on J. v. Neumann's Article on "A Model of Economic Equilibrium" Get access D. G. Champernowne D. G. Champernowne Oxford Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 13, Issue 1, 1945, Pages 10–18, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296112 Published: 01 April 1945

Journal Article Does the Consumer Benefit from Price Instability? Get access L. D. Howell L. D. Howell Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Washington, D. C. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 59, Issue 2, February 1945, Pages 287–295, https://doi.org/10.2307/1884829 Published: 01 February 1945

ONE of the most troublesome statistical I shortcomings at the outset of World War II was the lack of pertinent data on the behavior of the labor force under conditions of exaggerated demand. The exertions of the last war had been of much lesser magnitude; moreover, they had been inadequately and imperfectly recorded. There was little to serve as a guide in appraising manpower resources or in determining the most fruitful and feasible channeling of pressure and persuasion. The statistical record of this war will be much more complete. Not only are we better supplied with current information on the development of the nation's wartime labor force, but we also have become more fully aware of the necessity of attacking our manpower problems on an area basis. The geographical distribution of the stresses and strains accompanying the war effort has been far from uniform. An appreciation of the extent to which the population has met the increased demands, through mobility of workers and through the recruiting of persons who normally would not work, and of the practical limits of the expansibility of the labor force may be obtained in part by an analysis of some of the boom areas in which war production has been concentrated. In the spring of I944 the Bureau of the Census, in cooperation with the President's Committee for Congested Production Areas, conducted a census of ten boom areas, to secure data about the wartime population.' This census yielded information on the size of the labor force, the relative contributions of the various population groups to each area's labor supply, the part played by migrant workers, the length of the work-week, and other significant items. When compared with the benchmarks provided by the Decennial Census of Population four years previously, just before the beginning of the defense boom, these data furnish a graphic description of the dynamics of labor supply in wartime.2 Each of the designated areas was so defined as to include not only the center of industrial activity but also the surrounding territory in which many of the workers and their families live and in which many large new war plants have been built. Each area comprises a county or a group of contiguous counties, embracing a critical war production center. The areas and the counties which they comprise are as follows:

The article presents information on accounting for depreciation. Depreciation may be defined as an accounting cost which is arrived at by the use of methods which do not "attempt to measure the exhaustion which actually takes place within a given period," we thereby divorce the depreciation problem from the everyday world of business experience in which managerial decisions are made. Unquestionably, managements in their selection of depreciation methods have sometimes had purposes in mind other than an accurate accounting for depreciation. They have sometimes been motivated by an undue regard for financial conservatism. Even aside from the selection of methods, their depreciation policies have sometimes brought accounting results which have been positive misrepresentations of the facts. However, the accounting profession cannot afford to countenance such practices and still less can accountants afford to make them a basis for their own analysis of the problem of depreciation. The fact that managements have used methods of depreciation with different ends in view does not mean that the different methods rest upon basically different assumptions.

The article presents information on tax simplification. During the past few months, numerous committees representing various business and professional organizations have been working at the task of suggesting ways of "simplifying" the Federal income tax law. Their purpose is to make recommendations to Congress which, if adopted, will presumably result in a plainly written, easily understandable statute, supplemented (it is hoped) by equally clear regulations. The announced objectives of the tax planners are threefold: (1) simplification; (2) elimination of "inequities" and (3) encouragement of "risk capital." After studying the recommendations, Congress may proceed in one of two ways to bring about the desired reforms: it may repeal the existing Internal Revenue Code and enact a brand-new law, or it may retain the Code in its present form and make such changes as appear to be in order. Despite the apparent advantages of making a clean sweep and starting over, it would probably be impractical to discard the accumulated body of law and precedent; hence "simplification" will likely be accomplished by revising the present Code. To help bring about the maximum "simplification," it is suggested that certain sections be entirely removed from the Code.

I. Need for economic criteria in evaluating monopolistic practices, 330. — II. Development of cranberry growing, 332. — III. Development of processing, 336. — IV. Indictment of marketing organizations, 339. V. Demand for fresh cranberries, 340. — VI. Demand for cranberry sauce, 345. — VII. Growers' revenue from sales, 350. — VIII. Monopolistic vs. competitive allocation of the supply, 358. — IX. The quality factor, 365. — X. Reconsideration of the antitrust indictment, 366.