[In February 2003, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission officially certified a fourth credit rating agency, Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS), for use in bond investment regulations. After DBRS certification, bond yields change in the direction implied by the firm's DBRS rating relative to its ratings from other certified rating agencies. A one-notch-higher DBRS rating corresponds to a 39-basis-point reduction in a firm's debt cost of capital. The impact on yields is driven by cases where the DBRS rating is better than other ratings and is larger among bonds rated near the investment-grade cutoff. These findings indicate that ratings-based regulations on bond investment affect a firm's cost of debt capital.]

Moody's adjusts a firm's reported leverage across several dimensions to determine credit ratings. I find that changes to this adjustment methodology affect firm capital structure and investment decisions. In particular, in 2006, Moody's made several changes to its adjustment methodologies, which are arguably exogenous to changes in firm fundamentals. I show these changes significantly affect adjustments for firms in this year. I then show that these changes to adjustments in 2006 affect capital structure and investment decisions in 2007, especially for those firms with greatest exposure to the methodology changes. These results show that rating agencies have the power to affect corporate decisions.

Firms reduce leverage following credit rating downgrades. In the year following a downgrade, downgraded firms issue approximately 1.5%–2.0% less net debt relative to net equity as a percentage of assets compared to other firms. This relationship persists within an empirical model of target leverage behavior. The effect of a downgrade is larger at downgrades to a speculative grade rating and if commercial paper access is affected. In particular, firms downgraded to speculative are about twice as likely to reduce debt as other firms. Rating upgrades do not affect subsequent capital structure activity, suggesting that firms target minimum rating levels.

This article shows how to evaluate the performance of managed portfolios using stochastic discount factors (SDFs) from continuous-time term structure models. These models imply empirical factors that include time averages of the underlying state variables. The approach addresses a performance measurement bias, described by Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ivkovic (2000) and Ferson and Khang (2002), arising because fund managers may trade within the return measurement interval or hold positions in replicable options. The empirical factors contribute explanatory power in factor model regressions and reduce model pricing errors. We illustrate the approach on US government bond funds during 1986-2000.

This paper examines to what extent credit ratings directly affect capital structure decisions. The paper outlines discrete costs (benefits) associated with firm credit rating level differences and tests whether concerns for these costs (benefits) directly affect debt and equity financing decisions. Firms near a credit rating upgrade or downgrade issue less debt relative to equity than firms not near a change in rating. This behavior is consistent with discrete costs (benefits) of rating changes but is not explained by traditional capital structure theories. The results persist within previous empirical tests of the pecking order and tradeoff capital structure theories.

Exploiting demand shocks from changes in federal government spending, we examine how the organizational structure of a firm affects its investment behavior. Government spending shocks affect the investment of government-dependent conglomerate segments less than matched stand-alone firms. Investment also increases in lower government-dependent segments when other segments within the same firm experience positive demand shocks, indicating cross-subsidization between segments. We further show that this cross-subsidization leads to worse operating performance and increases the diversification discount. Our findings are robust after addressing the endogeneity of government spending.

We examine corporate financial and investment decisions made by female executives compared with male executives. Male executives undertake more acquisitions and issue debt more often than female executives. Further, acquisitions made by firms with male executives have announcement returns approximately 2% lower than those made by female executive firms, and debt issues also have lower announcement returns for firms with male executives. Female executives place wider bounds on earnings estimates and are more likely to exercise stock options early. This evidence suggests men exhibit relative overconfidence in significant corporate decision making compared with women.

In February 2003, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission officially certified a fourth credit rating agency, Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS), for use in bond investment regulations. After DBRS certification, bond yields change in the direction implied by the firm's DBRS rating relative to its ratings from other certified rating agencies. A one-notch-higher DBRS rating corresponds to a 39-basis-point reduction in a firm's debt cost of capital. The impact on yields is driven by cases where the DBRS rating is better than other ratings and is larger among bonds rated near the investment-grade cutoff. These findings indicate that ratings-based regulations on bond investment affect a firm's cost of debt capital.

We estimate Moody’s preference for accurate versus biased ratings using hand-collected data on the internal labor market outcomes of its analysts. We find that accurate analysts are more likely to be promoted and less likely to depart. The opposite is true for analysts who downgrade more frequently, who assign ratings below those predicted by a ratings model, and whose downgrades are associated with large negative market reactions. Downgraded firms are also more likely to be assigned a new analyst. These patterns are consistent with Moody’s balancing its desire for accuracy against its corporate clients’ desire for higher ratings.

We examine whether short sellers identify firms that have significant changes in default likelihoods and credit rating downgrades. In the month before a rating downgrade, equity short interest is 40% higher than one year prior. Short sellers predict changes in default probabilities that lead to downgrades by focusing on firms with inaccurate or biased ratings. This strategy is profitable for short sellers primarily since downgrades are associated with significantly negative equity returns. Short sellers also facilitate price discovery by reducing abnormal stock returns following downgrades and by leading bond yield spreads.