State universities are budgeted by their respective states based upon the number of students in attendance at each university. The university must often make a forecast of enrollment for budgetary purposes two years in advance because of various administrative and legislative procedures. When the university under-predicts enrollment, upon which state appropriations will be based, there will be a subsequent shortage of funds. On the other hand, an overprediction of enrollment entails the return of funds to the state unless the overprediction is within some limit prescribed by the state.

Reviews the book "The Case for Marginal Costing," by S. Dixon.

In this paper we study the quantitative impact of marginal tax rates on the distribution of income. Our methodology builds on computable general-equilibrium framework. We find that distortions from marginal tax rate changes of the sort implied by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 have sizable effects on income inequality in a reasonably quantified life-cycle setting: In our model rate changes alone capture half the increase in the pretax Gini that actually occurred between 1984 and 1989.

Monetary and Nonmonetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism by David Masclet, Charles Noussair, Steven Tucker and Marie-Claire Villeval. Published in volume 93, issue 1, pages 366-380 of American Economic Review, March 2003