A dynamic search framework is developed to analyze the intertemporal labor force participation behavior of married women, using longitudinal data to allow for a rich dynamic structure. The sensitivity to alternative distributional assumptions is evaluated using linear probability and probit models. The dynamic probit models are estimated using maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) estimation, to overcome the computational difficulties inherent in maximum likelihood estimation of models with nontrivial error structures. The results find that participation decisions are characterized by significant state dependence, unobserved heterogeneity, and negative serial correlation in the error component. The hypothesis that fertility decisions are exogenous to women's participation decisions is rejected when dynamics are ignored; however, there is no evidence against this hypothesis in dynamic model specifications. Women's participation response is stronger to permanent than current nonlabor income, reflecting unobserved taste factors.

This paper studies the labor supply contributions to individual and family earnings inequality during the period of rising wage inequality in the early 1980's. Working couples have positively correlated labor market outcomes, which are almost entirely attributable to permanent factors. An intertemporal family labor supply model with this feature is used to estimate labor supply elasticities for husbands of 0.05, and wives of 0.40. This implies that labor supply explains little of the rising annual earnings inequality for married men, but over 20 percent of the rise in family inequality and 50 percent of the modest rise in female inequality.

Using data for three cohorts of women in the PSID, we show that annual earnings inequality fell sharply between the late 1960s and the mid-1990s, with a large decline in the component attributable to the extensive margin. We then fit earnings-generating models that incorporate both intensive- and extensive-margin dynamics to data for the three cohorts. Our models suggest that more than 80% of the decline in female earnings inequality can be attributed to a weakening of the link between family-based factors (i.e., children and the presence and incomes of partners) and the intensive and extensive margins of earnings determination.

In the Self Sufficiency Project (SSP) welfare demonstration, members of a randomly assigned treatment group could receive a subsidy for full-time work. The subsidy was available for 3 years, but only to people who began working full time within 12 months of random assignment. A simple optimizing model suggests that the eligibility rules created an “establishment” incentive to find a job and leave welfare within a year of random assignment, and an “entitlement” incentive to choose work over welfare once eligibility was established. Building on this insight, we develop an econometric model of welfare participation that allows us to separate the two effects and estimate the impact of the earnings subsidy on welfare entry and exit rates among those who achieved eligibility. The combination of the two incentives explains the time profile of the experimental impacts, which peaked 15 months after random assignment and faded relatively quickly. Our findings suggest that about half of the peak impact of SSP was attributable to the establishment incentive. Despite the extra work effort generated by SSP, the program had no lasting impact on wages and little or no long-run effect on welfare participation.

Firms frequently provide general skill training for workers. Theories propose that labor market frictions entail wage compression, generate larger productivity gains than wage growth to skill acquisition, and motivate a firm to offer general skill training, but few studies directly test them. We use unusually rich data from a temporary help service firm that records both workers’ wages and their productivity as measured by the fees charged to client firms. We find that skill acquired through training and learning by doing increases productivity more than wages, with such wage compression accounting for half of the average 40% productivity growth over 5 years of tenure.