[Expanding access to commercial credit is a key ingredient of financial development strategies. There is less consensus on whether expanding access to consumer credit helps borrowers, particularly when loans are extended at high interest rates. Popular skepticism about "unproductive," "usurious" lending is fueled by research highlighting behavioral biases that may induce overborrowing. We estimate the impacts of expanding access to consumer credit at a 200% annual percentage rate (APR) using a field experiment and follow-up data collection. The randomly assigned marginal loans produced significant net benefits for borrowers across a wide range of outcomes. There is also some evidence that the loans were profitable.]

Information asymmetries are important in theory but difficult to identify in practice. We estimate the presence and importance of hidden information and hidden action problems in a consumer credit market using a new field experiment methodology. We randomized 58,000 direct mail offers to former clients of a major South African lender along three dimensions: (i) an initial “offer interest rate” featured on a direct mail solicitation; (ii) a “contract interest rate” that was revealed only after a borrower agreed to the initial offer rate; and (ii) a dynamic repayment incentive that was also a surprise and extended preferential pricing on future loans to borrowers who remained in good standing. These three randomizations, combined with complete knowledge of the lender's information set, permit identification of specific types of private information problems. Our setup distinguishes hidden information effects from selection on the offer rate (via unobservable risk and anticipated effort), from hidden action effects (via moral hazard in effort) induced by actual contract terms. We find strong evidence of moral hazard and weaker evidence of hidden information problems. A rough estimate suggests that perhaps 13% to 21% of default is due to moral hazard. Asymmetric information thus may help explain the prevalence of credit constraints even in a market that specializes in financing high-risk borrowers.

We use randomized interest rates, offered across eighty geographically distinct regions for twenty-nine months by Mexico’s largest microlender, to sketch the adjustment from a price change to a new equilibrium. Demand is elastic, and more so over the longer run; e.g. the dollars-borrowed elasticity increases from -1.1 in Year one to -2.9 in Year three. Credit bureau data do not show evidence of crowd-out, although this and other null results are imprecisely estimated. The lender’s profits increase, albeit noisily, starting in Year two. But competitors do not respond by reducing rates. These findings, together with other results, suggest that informational frictions are important, and that cutting rates furthered Compartamos Banco’s “double bottom line” of improving social welfare subject to a profitability constraint.

Expanding access to commercial credit is a key ingredient of financial development strategies. There is less consensus on whether expanding access to consumer credit helps borrowers, particularly when loans are extended at high interest rates. Popular skepticism about “unproductive,” “usurious” lending is fueled by research highlighting behavioral biases that may induce overborrowing. We estimate the impacts of expanding access to consumer credit at a 200% annual percentage rate (APR) using a field experiment and follow-up data collection. The randomly assigned marginal loans produced significant net benefits for borrowers across a wide range of outcomes. There is also some evidence that the loans were profitable.

Questions remain as to whether results from experimental economics are generalizable to real decisions in nonlaboratory settings. Furthermore, questions persist about whether social capital helps mitigate information asymmetries in credit markets. I examine whether behavior in two laboratory games, Trust and a Public Goods, predicts loan repayments to a Peruvian group-lending microfinance program. Since this program relies on social capital to enforce repayment, this tests the external validity of the games. Individuals identified as “trustworthy” by the Trust Game are indeed less likely to default on their loans. No similar support is found for the game's identification of “trusting” individuals.

Policymakers often prescribe that microfinance institutions increase interest rates to eliminate their reliance on subsidies. This strategy makes sense if the poor are rate insensitive: then microlenders increase profitability (or achieve sustainability) without reducing the poor's access to credit. We test the assumption of price inelastic demand using randomized trials conducted by a consumer lender in South Africa. The demand curves are downward sloping, and steeper for price increases relative to the lender's standard rates. We also find that loan size is far more responsive to changes in loan maturity than to changes in interest rates, which is consistent with binding liquidity constraints.

What capital is missing in developing countries? We put forward “managerial capital,” which is distinct from human capital, as a key missing form of capital in developing countries. And it has also been curiously missing in the research on growth and development. We argue in this paper that lack of managerial capital has broad implications for firm growth as well as for the effectiveness of other input factors. A large literature in development economics aims to understand the impediments to firm growth, particularly in small and medium enterprises. Standard growth theories have explored the importance of input factors such as capital and labor in the production function of firms and countries. At the micro level, empirical studies such as Suresh de Mel, David McKenzie and Christopher Woodruff (2008), Abhijit Banerjee et al. (2009), and Dean Karlan and Jonathan Zinman (2009) have estimated the impact of access to finance for capital constrained microenterprises (see Karlan and Jonathan Morduch, 2009, for a review). At the macro level, papers by Robert King and Ross Levine (1993), Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales (1998), and Marianne Bertrand, Antoinette Schoar, and David Thesmar (2007) suggest the importance of the financial system for economic growth.

A randomized control trial with 432 small and medium enterprises in Mexico shows positive impact of access to 1 year of management consulting services on total factor productivity and return on assets. Owners also had an increase in “entrepreneurial spirit” (an index that measures entrepreneurial confidence and goal setting). Using Mexican social security data, we find a persistent large increase (about 50 percent) in the number of employees and total wage bill even 5 years after the program. We document large heterogeneity in the specific managerial practices that improved as a result of the consulting, with the most prominent being marketing, financial accounting, and long-term business planning.

Most academic and development policy discussions about microentrepreneurs focus on credit constraints and assume that subject to those constraints, the entrepreneurs manage their business optimally. Yet the self-employed poor rarely have any formal training in business skills. A growing number of microfinance organizations are attempting to build the human capital of microentrepreneurs in order to improve the livelihood of their clients and help further their mission of poverty alleviation. Using a randomized control trial, we measure the marginal impact of adding business training to a Peruvian group lending program for female microentrepreneurs. Treatment groups received thirty- to sixty-minute entrepreneurship training sessions during their normal weekly or monthly banking meeting over a period of one to two years. Control groups remained as they were before, meeting at the same frequency but solely for making loan and savings payments. We find little or no evidence of changes in key outcomes such as business revenue, profits, or employment. We nevertheless observed business knowledge improvements and increased client retention rates for the microfinance institution.