The financial crisis showed, once again, that neglecting real estate booms can have disastrous consequences. In this paper, we spell out the circumstances under which a more active policy agenda on this front would be justified. Then, we offer insights on the pros and cons as well as implementation challenges of various policy tools that can be used to contain the damage to the financial system and the economy from real estate boom–bust episodes. These insights derive from econometric analysis, when possible, and case studies of country experiences. Broadly, booms financed through credit and involving leverage are more likely to warrant a policy response. In that context, macroprudential measures can be targeted more precisely to specific sources of risk, but they may prove ineffective because of circumvention. In that case, monetary policy may have to be used to lean against the wind.

This paper exploits the Financial Accounts of the United States to derive long time series of bank and nonbank credit to different sectors, and to examine the cyclical behavior of these series in relation to (i) the long-term business cycle, (ii) recessions and recoveries, and (iii) systemic financial crises. We find that bank and nonbank credit exhibit different dynamics throughout the business cycle. We also examine the role of bank and nonbank credit in the creation of financial interconnections and illustrate a method to conduct macro-financial stability assessments.

We use firm-level data to provide some early evidence on the effectiveness of COVID-19 economic policy packages. Our empirical strategy relies on the varying degree of vulnerability to the pandemic across industries. We find a robust association of fiscal support with changes in firm performance indicators (as measured by sales-to-assets ratio, profit margin, interest coverage ratio as well as probability of default) in pandemic-prone sectors. We also observe marginal effects of monetary policy on the sales-to-assets ratio and of foreign exchange intervention on the interest coverage ratio in the hardest-hit firms. These results broadly survive a battery of exercises to address endogeneity. Additionally, we show that firms with a better financial position are more likely to take advantage of the support packages to withstand the pandemic shock. Overall, this preliminary evidence suggests that policy interventions have bought time for the hardest-hit industries, by supporting turnover and improving liquidity.

Does partisanship influence loan allocation through the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP)? We examine the 2020 Presidential campaign contributions made by lenders’ employees as a partisanship measure and leverage the PPP’s phased implementation under both the Trump and the Biden administrations. We find that partisan misalignment increases lending, particularly to small and first-time PPP borrowers, as well as those in Republican areas. Misalignment is also associated with higher payroll coverage for small businesses. Our findings are consistent with Republican-leaning lenders viewing the PPP’s 2021 phase as a legacy policy of the prior administration, shedding new light on the partisan-alignment phenomenon in finance.

This paper examines the resilience of banks as perceived by market participants during the COVID-19 crisis. We analyse how bank stock returns during January-March 2020 relate to the pre-crisis activation of macroprudential policy across 52 countries in a cross-sectional dimension. We find that, overall, a tighter macroprudential policy stance is beneficial for bank systemic risk, as assessed by equity market investors. A robust finding is that a perceived decrease in bank risk stems primarily from the use of credit growth limits, reserve requirements, and dynamic provisioning. By contrast, a pre-crisis build-up of capital surcharges on systemically important financial institutions seems to lower bank stock returns. Alternative bank risk indicators suggest that the latter is likely to be driven by concerns about profits rather than the probability of default.

Annual stress tests have become a regular part of the supervisors’ toolkit following the global financial crisis. We investigate their market implications in the United States by looking at price and trade reactions as well as information asymmetry and uncertainty indicators around the tests, and bank behavior after the tests. The evidence we present supports the notion that there is important new information in stress tests. This is particularly the case during crisis. Moreover, public disclosure appears not to adversely affect informational asymmetries and uncertainties. Importantly, public disclosure of stress test results (and methodology) does not seem to have reduced private incentives to generate information or to have led to distorted incentives.

We identify start days of 156 episodes of social unrest from textual analysis of media reports and show a systematic negative impact of social unrest on stock market performance. Social unrest on average leads to a 1.4 percentage point drop in cumulative abnormal returns in 2 weeks, more for events that last longer and that happen in emerging markets. Stronger institutions, particularly better governance and more democratic systems, are associated with a smaller adverse impact of social unrest on stock market returns. We argue this reflects the ability of better institutions to provide a more reliable way to reconcile conflicting views and dampen uncertainty after unrest.

We examine the association between capital inflows and industry growth in a sample of 22 emerging market economies from 1998 to 2010. We expect more external-finance-dependent industries, in countries that host more capital inflows, to grow disproportionately faster. This is indeed the case in the pre-crisis period of 1998–2007. In a panel regression analysis using annual changes, this relationship is driven by debt, rather than equity inflows. But when we consider the long-run effects using panel cointegration tests, equity inflows are those that contribute to growth. Further, we observe a reduction in output volatility, and this association is more pronounced for equity, rather than debt inflows. These relationships, however, break down during the crisis, indicating the importance of an undisrupted global financial system for emerging markets, if they are to harness the growth benefits of capital inflows. In line with this observation, we also document that the inflows-growth nexus is stronger in countries with well-functioning banks and better institutional quality.

We study how banks’ special interests affect the resolution of failed banks. Using a sample of FDIC auctions between 2007 and 2016, we find that bidding banks that lobby regulators have a higher probability of winning an auction. However, the FDIC incurs larger costs in such auctions, amounting to 24.8 percent of the total resolution losses. We also show that lobbying winners match less well with acquired banks and display worse post-acquisition performance than their non-lobbying counterparts, suggesting that lobbying interferes with an efficient allocation of failed banks. Our results provide new insights into the bank resolution process and the role of special interests.

The COVID-19 pandemic could result in large government interventions in the banking industry. To shed light on the possible consequences on markups, we rely on the experience of the Global Financial Crisis and exploit granular data on government interventions in more than 800 banks across 27 countries between 2007 and 2017. Using a multivariate matching method, we find no evidence of an increase in markups. Interventions—especially longer and larger ones—have no significant impact on prices but they increase costs, mostly because of higher loan impairment charges, lowering markups.