This paper investigates how dividend taxes influence portfolio choices, using the response to the distinctive treatment of a subset of foreign dividends in the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) of 2003. An open-economy after-tax capital asset pricing model is used to derive the hypothesis that JGTRRA should lead to a portfolio reallocation by U.S. investors toward equities in tax-favored countries. A difference-in-difference analysis that compares U.S. equity holdings in affected and unaffected countries finds a substantial portfolio reallocation toward the former. This effect cannot be explained by several potential alternative hypotheses, including differential changes to the preferences of American investors, differential changes in investment opportunities, differential time trends in investment, changed tax evasion behavior, or changes in stock prices associated (or contemporaneous) with JGTRRA.

The Homeland Investment Act provided a tax holiday for the repatriation of foreign earnings. Advocates argued the Act would alleviate financial constraints by reducing the cost to U.S. multinationals of accessing internal capital. This paper shows that repatriations did not increase domestic investment, employment, or R&D—even for firms that appeared to be financially constrained or lobbied for the holiday. Instead, a $1 increase in repatriations was associated with a $0.60 to $0.92 increase in shareholder payouts. Regulations intended to restrict such payouts were undermined by the fungibility of money. Results indicate that U.S. multinationals were not financially constrained and were well‐governed.