This paper presents evidence of the shareholder wealth effect of institutional activism using its spillovers on non-target companies. The spillovers are instructive because they are a response to an exogenous shock and thus create an environment to conduct a clean event study. In particular, we examine the spillover effects of the first target announcement of the Korea Corporate Governance Fund. As the very first sign of institutional activism in the country, this announcement creates an expectation of similar governance efforts even in non-target companies, especially in those companies whose governance is currently poorer and thus the scope for future activism is greater. Consistent with institutional activism contributing to shareholder wealth, we find that, among non-targets, those firms granting fewer rights to outside shareholders experience a more positive stock price reaction. Further analysis lends additional support to the positive wealth effect of institutional activism.

We investigate the relation between price informativeness and idiosyncratic return volatility in a multi-asset, multi-period noisy rational expectations equilibrium. We show that the relation between price informativeness and idiosyncratic return volatility is either U-shaped or negative. Using several price informativeness measures, we empirically document a U-shaped relation between price informativeness and idiosyncratic return volatility. Our study therefore reconciles the opposing views in the following two strands of literature: (1) the growing body of research showing that firms with more informative stock prices have greater idiosyncratic return volatility, and (2) the studies arguing that more information in price reduces idiosyncratic return volatility.

This paper proposes an investor heterogeneity approach to the different domestic stock holdings between domestic and foreign investors. Specifically, we hypothesize that domestic and foreign investors evaluate domestic stocks via different models and thus arrive at different valuations for them; consequently, the two investor groups are attracted to different sets of domestic stocks. Using panel data from Korea, we find strong support for our hypothesis. More precisely, we find that the foreign ownership of a stock increases with foreigners’ valuation for the stock in excess of that of domestic investors. As we control for various firm characteristics known to be correlated with foreign ownership, our results indicate that the valuation difference between domestic and foreign investors can help explain the allocation of domestic stocks between the two groups over and above the existing explanations.

This paper proposes and tests the hypothesis that takeover vulnerability contributes to short-term price reversal by motivating investors to trade speculatively and also by making investors demand immediacy in their trades. That is, takeover vulnerability is hypothesized to amplify two channels of short-term price reversal, namely, overreaction and price concession. Using several different measures of takeover vulnerability, we find that takeover vulnerability is positively related to price reversal at daily frequencies. We also find that their positive relation is more pronounced when the stock is illiquid or when it is costly to arbitrage, a finding that is consistent with the notion that the observed price reversal is driven by the earlier price concession or overreaction. While unable to determine the exact relative importance between the two channels, we conduct further analysis showing that each channel plays an independent role. Finally, we find no relation between takeover vulnerability and price reversal at the portfolio level, which means that the price reversal observed in individual stock returns is driven by a firm-specific component.

High Tobin’s q industries receive more funding from capital markets than low Tobin’s q industries from 1971 to 1996. Since then, the opposite is true. The key to understanding this shift is that large firms, for which q is more a proxy for rents than investment opportunities, have become more important within industries. For these firms, repurchases but not capital expenditures increase in the cross-section with q, so that q explains the variation of repurchases more than of capital expenditures. Consequently, equity capital flows out of high q industries because for these industries stock repurchases are high and issuances are low.