We characterize the steady-state equilibrium in which informed traders who exhibit heuristic (i.e., representativeness, as opposed to Bayesian) and Bayesian behaviors achieve the same expected utility. Then, we show how the endogenous, steady-state proportion of heuristic traders is affected by the quality of public information and other exogenous features of our model. Finally, we discuss how the presence of heuristic traders potentially alters the link between improved public disclosure and market liquidity, the variance in the change in price, and market efficiency.

In this discussion I comment on the contribution of two papers toward our understanding of how disclosure affects the cost of capital. Specifically, in the context of these papers, I comment on whether disclosure ameliorates or exacerbates the cost of capital that arises from the existence of information asymmetries in capital markets. This is a notion that should be of fundamental interest in that it provides an economic basis for evaluating the costs and benefits of accounting information.

This paper is a selective survey of fiscal federalism. It begins with a brief review and some reflections on the traditional theory of fiscal federalism: the assignment of functions to levels of government, the welfare gains from fiscal decentralization, and the use of fiscal instruments. It then explores a series of important topics that are the subject of current research: laboratory federalism, interjurisdictional competition and environmental federalism, the political economy of fiscal federalism, market-preserving federalism, and fiscal decentralization in the developing and transitional economies.

Auditing, Auditor hypothesis testing, Diagnostic inference, Incentives

We use an option pricing framework to model equity valuation when firms face costs associated with violating accounting-based debt covenants. Our model shows that the value of equity depends on two factors: the economic value of the firm and the probability that the firm violates the covenant. Consistent with the model's prediction that the `covenant' effect is greatest for firms near covenant violation, we find that responses to earnings that are less informative about future cash flows (losses and transitory earnings) are significant only for thrift institutions that are near violation of regulatory net worth covenants.

We study when it is appropriate to add a convex component such as stock options to an optimal, managerial compensation contract. We show that convexity is introduced when managers have moderate levels of relative risk aversion and decreasing absolute risk aversion. In addition, we study how convexity is affected as the distribution of outcomes becomes more skewed toward low outcomes. Here we show that while convexity increases when skewness is increased without regard to the effect on mean stock price, the opposite effect results when increases in skewness leave the mean stock price unchanged.

A “grid” bootstrap method is proposed for confidence-interval construction, which has improved performance over conventional bootstrap methods when the sampling distribution depends upon the parameter of interest. The basic idea is to calculate the bootstrap distribution over a grid of values of the parameter of interest and form the confidence interval by the no-rejection principle. Our primary motivation is given by autoregressive models, where it is known that conventional bootstrap methods fail to provide correct first-order asymptotic coverage when an autoregressive root is close to unity. In contrast, the grid bootstrap is first-order correct globally in the parameter space. Simulation results verify these insights, suggesting that the grid bootstrap provides an important improvement over conventional methods. Gauss code that calculates the grid bootstrap intervals-and replicates the empirical work reported in this paper'is available from the author's Web page at www.ssc.wisc.edu˜bhansen

Abstract This study examines the predictive value of Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) information. More specifically, this study tests the association between properties of analysts' earnings forecasts and MD&A quality, where MD&A quality is measured by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). We find that high MD&A ratings are associated with less error and less dispersion in analysts' earnings forecasts after controlling for many other expected influences on analysts' forecasts. We also find that estimated regression coefficients are consistent with MD&A information having a substantial effect on earnings forecasts. Finally, we find our results are driven by forward‐looking disclosures about capital expenditures and operations, and also by historical disclosures about capital expenditures. These findings are consistent with the suggestion by many constituencies (including the SEC) that the type of information found in high quality MD&A is particularly relevant for predicting earnings.