The arrival of public information in the U.S. Treasury market sets off a two‐stage adjustment process for prices, trading volume, and bid‐ask spreads. In a brief first stage, the release of a major macroeconomic announcement induces a sharp and nearly instantaneous price change with a reduction in trading volume, demonstrating that price reactions to public information do not require trading. The spread widens dramatically at announcement, evidently driven by inventory control concerns. In a prolonged second stage, trading volume surges, price volatility persists, and spreads remain moderately wide as investors trade to reconcile residual differences in their private views.

How susceptible to contagion are bank deposits associated with financial inclusion? To assess this susceptibility, we analyze the behavior of deposits around three significant events of bank failure in the Philippines. We conduct the event studies with the advantage of a unique dataset that disaggregates deposits by size at the town level. We show that both small and large deposits are withdrawn up to 4–5 quarters before the bank’s closure. We take advantage of this distinction between small and large deposits to test for contagion. Applying difference-in-difference regressions, we find evidence of contagion: the closure of a large bank leads to withdrawals at banks in neighboring towns by depositors both large and small. This is the case for two of the three events, and when the data is taken collectively. That there is a market for information affects deposit insurance as a safety net for depositors and as a disciplining tool for banks. There are also liquidity considerations that banks need to consider. In any case, we consistently find the behavior of small depositors to be no different from that of large depositors. Hence, if financial inclusion is about access to bank deposits, it is not likely to heighten systemic risks nor mitigate them.

The arrival of public information in the U.S. Treasury market sets off a two‐stage adjustment process for prices, trading volume, and bid‐ask spreads. In a brief first stage, the release of a major macroeconomic announcement induces a sharp and nearly instantaneous price change with a reduction in trading volume, demonstrating that price reactions to public information do not require trading. The spread widens dramatically at announcement, evidently driven by inventory control concerns. In a prolonged second stage, trading volume surges, price volatility persists, and spreads remain moderately wide as investors trade to reconcile residual differences in their private views.