Using proprietary credit default swap (CDS) data, I investigate how capital shocks at protection sellers impact pricing in the CDS market. Seller capital shocks—measured as CDS portfolio margin payments—account for 12% of the time‐series variation in weekly spread changes, a significant amount given that standard credit factors account for 18% during my sample. In addition, seller shocks possess information for spreads that is independent of institution‐wide measures of constraints. These findings imply a high degree of market segmentation, and suggest that frictions within specialized financial institutions prevent capital from flowing into the market at shorter horizons.

We study how investment fees vary within private equity funds. Net‐of‐fee return clustering suggests that most funds have two tiers of fees, and we decompose differences across tiers into both management‐ and performance‐based fees. Managers of venture capital funds and those in high demand are less likely to use multiple fee schedules. Some investors consistently pay lower fees relative to others within their funds. Investor size, experience, and past performance explain some but not all of this effect, suggesting that unobserved traits like negotiation skill or bargaining power materially impact the fees that investors pay to access private markets.

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, institutions have been asked to reduce leverage in order to reduce risk. To address the effectiveness of this measure, we build a model of equity volatility that accounts for leverage. Our approach blends Merton’s insights on capital structure with traditional time-series models of volatility. We estimate that precautionary capital needs for the entire financial sector reached $2 trillion during the crisis. We also investigate the long-standing observation that equity volatility asymmetrically responds to positive and negative news. Volatility asymmetry is mostly explained by exposure to the aggregate market, not a mechanical leverage effect.

We use arbitrage activity in equity, fixed income, and foreign exchange markets to characterize the frictions and constraints facing intermediaries. The average pairwise correlation between the 32 arbitrage spreads that we study is 22%. These low correlations are inconsistent with canonical intermediary asset pricing models. We show that at least two types of segmentation drive arbitrage dynamics. First, funding is segmented—certain trades rely on specific funding sources, making their arbitrage spreads sensitive to localized funding shocks. Second, balance sheets are segmented—intermediaries specialize in certain trades, so arbitrage spreads are sensitive to idiosyncratic balance‐sheet shocks.

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, institutions have been asked to reduce leverage in order to reduce risk. To address the effectiveness of this measure, we build a model of equity volatility that accounts for leverage. Our approach blends Merton’s insights on capital structure with traditional time-series models of volatility. We estimate that precautionary capital needs for the entire financial sector reached $2 trillion during the crisis. We also investigate the long-standing observation that equity volatility asymmetrically responds to positive and negative news. Volatility asymmetry is mostly explained by exposure to the aggregate market, not a mechanical leverage effect. Received March 27, 2015; editorial decision February 25, 2017 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

We provide evidence that financial market risk perceptions are important drivers of economic fluctuations. We introduce a novel measure of risk perceptions: the price of volatile stocks (PVSt), defined as the book-to-market ratio of low-volatility stocks minus the book-to-market ratio of high-volatility stocks. PVSt is high when perceived risk directly measured from surveys and option prices is low. Using our measure, we show that high perceived risk is associated with low risk-free interest rates, a high cost of capital for risky firms, and future declines in output and real investment. Perceived risk as measured by PVSt falls after positive macroeconomic news. These declines are predictably followed by upward revisions in perceived risk, indicating that fluctuations in investor risk perceptions are not fully rational.

We study the effect of dealer exit on prices and quantities in a model of an over-the-counter market featuring a core-periphery network with bilateral trading costs. The model is calibrated using regulatory data on the entire U.S. credit default swap (CDS) market between 2010 and 2013. Prices depend crucially on the risk-bearing capacity of core dealers, yet unlike standard models featuring a dealer sector, we allow for heterogeneity in dealer risk-bearing capacity. This heterogeneity is quantitatively important. Depending on how well dealers share risk, the exit of a single dealer can cause credit spreads to rise by 8 % to 24%.