Recent studies using aging analysis have found high rates of default for rated, nonconvertible high‐yield bonds. This paper examines the remainder of the market and concludes that rated and nonrated convertible high‐yield bonds had significantly lower default rates. It also provides some evidence that nonrated, nonconvertible securities may have lower default rates. Even after controlling for issue size and coupon rates in a logit model, these differences remain statistically significant.

Recent studies using aging analysis have found high rates of default for rated, nonconvertible high-yield bonds. This paper examines the remainder of the market and concludes that rated and nonrated convertible high-yield bonds had significantly lower default rates. It also provides some evidence that nonrated, nonconvertible securities may have lower default rates. Even after controlling for issue size and coupon rates in a logit model, these differences remain statistically significant.

Recent studies using aging analysis have found high rates of default for rated, nonconvertible high-yield bonds. This paper examines the remainder of the market and concludes that rated. and nonrated convertible high-yield bonds had significantly lower defaul t rates. It also provides some evidence that nonrated, nonconvertible securities may have lower default rates. Even after controlling for issue size and coupon rates in a logit model, these differences rema in statistically significant.

We find that acquirers tend to recast the target in their own image, causing the small business loan portfolio share of the consolidated bank to converge toward the pre-merger portfolio share of the acquirer. However, concerns that this pattern will necessarily reduce bank small business lending may be overblown. First, most mergers are of two (or more) small banks. Second, acquirers are almost as likely to have larger as smaller shares of small business loans in their portfolios, compared to their targets. Finally, in roughly half the mergers, small business loans increase in the period immediately after the merger.

We examine the misallocation of credit in Japan associated with the perverse incentives faced by banks to provide additional credit to the weakest firms. Firms are more likely to receive additional bank credit if they are in poor financial condition, because troubled Japanese banks have an incentive to allocate credit to severely impaired borrowers in order to avoid the realization of losses on their own balance sheets. This “evergreening” behavior is more prevalent among banks that have reported capital ratios close to the required minimum, and is compounded by the incentives arising from extensive corporate affiliations.

The Japanese banking crisis provides a natural experiment to test whether a loan supply shock can affect real economic activity. Because the shock was external to U.S. credit markets, yet connected through the Japanese bank penetration of U.S. markets, this event allows us to identify an exogenous loan supply shock and ultimately link that shock to construction activity in U.S. commercial real estate markets. We exploit the variation across geographically distinct commercial real estate markets to establish conclusively that loan supply shocks emanating from Japan had real effects on economic activity in the United States.

The size of Japanese bank lending operations in the United States enables us to use U.S. banking data to investigate the extent to which the sharp decline in Japanese stock prices was transmitted to the United States via U.S. branches of Japanese parent banks, as well as to identify a supply shock to U.S. bank lending that is independent of U.S. loan demand. We find that binding risk-based capital requirements associated with the Japanese stock market decline resulted in a decrease in lending by Japanese banks in the United States that was both economically and statistically significant.

We examine the stock market reaction to announcements of formal supervisory actions. We find that the variation in the quality and timeliness of disclosure by U.S. banks explains much of the variation in the market's reactions. We also find that these announcements can cause spillover effects. However, rather than representing contagion, these spillover effects are consistent with enhanced transparency. Only banks in the same region as the announcing bank, with similar exposures, are affected. Thus, enhanced disclosure can improve the allocation of resources in the banking system. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G21, G28.

We examine foreign acquisitions of United States banks around the time of the ownership change to determine whether the observed poor performance of foreign subsidiaries is the result of changes in business strategy or the preexisting characteristics of the target bank. We find that many of the problems were already present at the time of acquisition. However, changes in business strategy by the foreign owners were generally not successful in raising the bank’s performance level to that of its domestic peers.

During the 1980's, theories were developed to explain the striking correlation between real exchange rates and foreign direct investment (FDI). However, this relationship broke down for Japanese FDI in the 1990's, as the real exchange rate appreciated while FDI plummeted. We propose the relative access to credit hypothesis and show that unequal access to credit by Japanese firms contributes to the explanation of declining Japanese FDI. Using bank-level and firm-level data sets, we find that financial difficulties at banks were economically and statistically important in reducing the number of FDI projects by Japanese firms into the United States.