Using a firm-level international panel data set, we study if unemployment insurance offered by the government and by firms are substitutes. We exploit cross-country and time-series variation in public unemployment insurance as a shifter of workers’ demand for insurance within firms, and family versus nonfamily ownership as a shifter of firms’ supply of insurance. Our evidence supports the substitutability hypothesis: employment stability in family firms is greater, and the wage discount larger, in countries and periods with less generous public unemployment insurance, whereas no such substitutability emerges for nonfamily firms.

We document the structure of firm-bank relationships for the 11 largest countries in the euro area and present new stylized facts using data from AnaCredit. We look at the number of banking relationships, reliance on the main bank, credit instruments, loan maturity, and interest rates. Firms in southern Europe borrow from more banks and obtain a lower share of credit from the main bank than those in northern Europe. They also tend to borrow more on short-term, more expensive instruments and to obtain loans with shorter maturity. The findings are consistent with the hypothesis that firms in southern Europe rely less on relationship banking and obtain credit less conducive to firm growth, in line with their smaller average size. Relationship lending does not translate into lower rates, possibly because banks appropriate part of the surplus generated by relationship lending through higher rates. Finally, assortative matching, according to which small banks specialize in supplying credit to small firms, is stronger in northern European countries.

We document that individuals who grow up in high firm density areas are more likely to become entrepreneurs, given firm density in their current location, and to run businesses in the sector with the highest density when young. Firm density at an entrepreneur’s young age drives current firm profitability and is more important than current density for business performance. Results hold in a sample of movers, which allows addressing endogeneity concerns. These results are consistent with entrepreneurial skills being partly learnable through social contacts. Accordingly, entrepreneurs who grow up in high firm density areas adopt better managerial practices.

The policy response to COVID-19 includes the provision of credit guarantees to firms, a provision that may generate zombie lending. According to the recent literature, the relative performance of healthy firms deteriorates as the fraction of zombies increases. We argue that this literature faces a serious identification problem, because firm performance is often used to define zombies (sometimes implicitly). We show that, under general conditions for the distribution of firm performance, the correlation between healthy firm performance and zombies is a mechanical consequence of an increase in the fraction of zombies with no causal meaning.

We use linked employer-employee data from Italy to explore the relationship between exports and wages. Exploiting the 1992 devaluation of the lira, we show that exporting firms both pay a wage premium above what their workers would earn in the outside labor market (the “rent-sharing” effect) and employ workers whose skills command a higher price after the devaluation (the “skill composition” effect). The latter only emerges once we allow for the value of workers’ skills to differ in the pre- and post-devaluation periods. We also document that the export wage premium is larger for workers with more export-related experience.

We study the effects on corporate loan rates of an unexpected change in the Italian legislation that forbade interlocking directorates between banks. Exploiting multiple firm‐bank relationships to fully account for all unobserved heterogeneity, we find that prohibiting interlocks decreased the interest rates of previously interlocked banks by 14 basis points relative to other banks. The effect is stronger for high‐quality firms and for loans extended by interlocked banks with a large joint market share. Interest rates on loans from previously interlocked banks become more dispersed. Finally, firms borrowing more from previously interlocked banks expand investment, employment, and sales.

We evaluate the allocation of risk between firms and their workers using matched employer‐employee panel data. Unlike previous contributions, this paper focuses on idiosyncratic shocks to the firm, which are the correct empirical counterpart of the theoretical notion of diversifiable risk. We allow for both temporary and permanent shocks to output and find that firms absorb temporary fluctuations fully but insure workers against permanent shocks only partially. Risk‐sharing considerations can account for about 15 percent of overall earnings variability, the remainder originating from idiosyncratic shocks to individual workers. Our welfare calculations indicate that firms are an important vehicle of insurance provision.

Using exhaustive administrative data on Italian social security records, we construct measures of local labour market thickness for executives that vary by industry and location. We show that firm performance is strongly and persistently affected by executive death, but only in thin local labour markets. The new executives hired after death events in thin local labour markets have lower education levels and are more likely to be replaced. These predictions are consistent with a simple model of executive search in which market thickness determines the arrival rate of applications for executive positions.

We study the relation between workers’ skill dispersion and firm productivity using a unique data set of Italian manufacturing firms with individual records on all their workers. Our measure of skill is the individual worker’s effect from a wage equation. We find that a firm’s productivity is positively related to skill dispersion within occupational status groups (production and nonproduction workers) and negatively related to skill dispersion between these groups. Consistently, most of the overall skill dispersion is within and not between firms. These findings are consistent with some recent hierarchical models of the firms’ organizational structure.

We examine the effects of mandatory board gender quotas on unregulated firms that are connected to regulated ones via interlocking directorates. After the introduction of quotas, connected firms significantly increase their share of female directors relative to similar unconnected firms. The spillover effects are substantial — at least as large as the direct effects on regulated firms, challenging previous claims that quotas have no broader impact on women in business. Our results suggest that quotas indirectly broaden the supply of candidates for connected firms, along dimensions that include, but are not limited to, gender.