We investigate the joint optimal risk management and capital structure decisions of banks when they use contingent-convertible (CoCo) futures contracts to hedge financial-sector risk. In spite of banks choosing significantly higher leverage ratios, their default probabilities drop appreciably while their equity values increase, allowing banks to compete more favorably with the shadow-banking system. Banks’ value-maximizing decision to hedge financial-sector risk unintentionally leads to an economy with extremely low aggregate bank default rates across all future states of nature. Thus, CoCo futures offer a powerful microprudential and macroprudential policy tool. That banks choose not to hedge financial-sector risk in practice is consistent with managers internalizing bank bailouts.

This paper examines how cultural distance affects fund transfers in the internal capital market of multinational firms. The results show that a larger cultural distance significantly reduces internal fund transfers to foreign subsidiaries. These results are robust to alternative measures of cultural distance and different econometric specifications. External shocks do not affect the results. Further analysis shows that the negative cultural impact is driven mainly by the dimensions of power distance, individualism, and uncertainty avoidance. Furthermore, the effect of cultural distance on internal fund transfers is independent of subsidiary productivity, and a larger cultural distance exacerbates the negative impact of corporate diversification on firm value. Overall, our findings highlight the important role that culture plays in multinationals’ global operations.