We investigate the effect of the “7% solution”—the fact that underwriters in the U.S. charge a 7% spread to most IPOs between 20 million and 100 million in size—on the ensuing pricing of the offerings. Our identification exploits the variation in spreads that is due to distinct kinks in the relation between spread and offer size at these two thresholds. We find the spread positively influences underpricing but also the offer-price adjustment from the filing range's midpoint. Our evidence indicates the spread influences the aftermarket price, suggesting underwriters can shape, not merely discover, investor valuations.

We examine how an underwriter's reputation accumulates upon each attempt to take a firm public, conditional on the bank demonstrating abnormal performance bringing—or failing to bring—the offering to market. We develop a novel measure of abnormal underwriting performance by weighing the ex-ante difficulty of completing the offering against the actual outcome. We show this measure positively associates with future changes in the underwriter's market share and issuing volume. The effect manifests as access to more offerings and is prominent when difficult offerings are completed, for abnormal performance demonstrated in midmarket (20–100 million) and large IPOs, and for both the primary lead and co‑lead underwriters. Abnormal performance is associated with a higher underwriting spread and aggressive IPO pricing.

We examine whether underwriters price up weakly demanded initial public offerings (IPOs) to prevent withdrawal. Our empirical strategy exploits a discontinuity in the distribution of IPO prices around the low boundary of the filing range. Offerings with a high ex ante withdrawal probability that are priced at this boundary are likely priced up to meet issuers’ reservation prices. We compare the aftermarket returns of these IPOs to the returns of other weakly demanded offerings where issuers’ reservation prices were likely not binding, and we identify a negative 8.4-percentage-point differential attributable to the aggressive pricing inherent in setting the price at the low boundary when withdrawal risk is high.

In 2011, Colombia instituted a tax on repayment of bank loans, which increased the cost of short‐term bank credit more than long‐term credit. Firms responded by cutting short‐term loans for liquidity management purposes and increasing the use of cash and trade credit. In industries in which trade credit is more accessible (based on U.S. Compustat firms), we find substitution into accounts payable and little effect on cash and investment. Where trade credit is less available, firms increase cash and cut investment. Thus, trade credit provides an alternative source of liquidity that can insulate some firms from bank liquidity shocks.

We show that sovereign debt impairments can have a significant effect on financial markets and real economies through a credit ratings channel. Specifically, we find that firms reduce their investment and reliance on credit markets due to a rising cost of debt capital following a sovereign rating downgrade. We identify these effects by exploiting exogenous variation in corporate ratings due to rating agencies' sovereign ceiling policies, which require that firms' ratings remain at or below the sovereign rating of their country of domicile.