Patterns in cross-border banking have changed since the global financial crisis. This may affect domestic bank market structures and macroeconomic stability in the longer term. In this study, I theoretically and empirically analyze how different modes of cross-border banking impact bank concentration and market power. I use a two-country general equilibrium model with heterogeneous banks developed by DeBlas and Russ (2010a) to grasp the effect of cross-border lending and foreign direct investment in the banking sector on bank market structures. The model suggests that both cross-border lending and bank FDI mitigate concentration. Empirical evidence from a panel dataset of 18 OECD countries supports the theoretical predictions: higher volumes of bank FDI and of cross-border lending coincide with lower Herfindahl-indexes in bank credit markets.

We explore the impact of large banks and of financial openness for aggregate growth. Large banks matter because of granular effects: if markets are very concentrated in terms of the size distribution of banks, idiosyncratic shocks at the bank-level do not cancel out in the aggregate but can affect macroeconomic outcomes. Financial openness may affect GDP growth in and of itself, and it may also influence concentration in banking and thus the impact of bank-specific shocks for the aggregate economy. To test these relationships, we use different measures of de jure and de facto financial openness in a panel dataset for 79 countries and the years 1996–2009. Our research has three main findings: First, bank-level shocks significantly impact upon GDP. Second, financial openness tends to lower GDP growth. Third, granular effects tend to be stronger in financially closed economies.

This paper analyzes the effects of bank capital regulation on the link between bank size and volatility. Using bank-level data for 27 advanced economies over the 2000–2014 period, we estimate a power law that relates the volume of a bank’s loan portfolio to the volatility of loan growth. Our analysis reveals, first, that more stringent capital regulation weakens the size-volatility nexus. Hence, in countries with more stringent capital regulation, large banks show, ceteris paribus, lower loan portfolio volatility. Second, the effect of tighter capital requirements on the size-volatility nexus becomes stronger for the upper tail of the bank size distribution. This is in line with capitalization decreasing with bank size, such that larger banks tend to be more affected by increasing capital requirements. Third, in countries with higher sectoral capital buffers, the size-volatility nexus is weaker.

Regulatory bank levies set incentives for banks to reduce leverage. At the same time, corporate income taxation makes funding through debt more attractive. In this paper, we explore how regulatory levies affect bank capital structure, depending on corporate income taxation. Based on bank balance sheet data from 2006 to 2014 for a panel of EU-banks, our analysis yields three main results: The introduction of bank levies leads to lower leverage as liabilities become more expensive. This effect is weaker the more elevated corporate income taxes are. In countries charging very high corporate income taxes, the incentives of bank levies to reduce leverage turn insignificant. Thus, bank levies can counteract the debt bias of taxation only partially.