Journal Article Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly: Reply Get access Jonathan Eaton, Jonathan Eaton University of Virginia Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Gene M. Grossman Gene M. Grossman Princeton University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 103, Issue 3, August 1988, Pages 603–607, https://doi.org/10.2307/1885548 Published: 01 August 1988

We analyze trade in both legitimate and counterfeit products. Domestic firms own trademarks and establish reputations for delivering high-quality products. Foreign suppliers export legitimate low-quality merchandise and counterfeits of domestic brand-name goods. Home consumers have rational expectations regarding counterfeiting. We describe the positive and normative effects of counterfeiting, and provide a welfare analysis of border inspection policy and of policy regarding the disposition of counterfeit goods that are confiscated at the border.

We study the positive and normative effects of counterfeiting, i.e., trademark infringement, in markets where consumers are not deceived by forgeries. Consumers are willing to pay more for counterfeits than for generic merchandise of similar quality because they value the prestige associated with brand-name trademarks. Counterfeiters of status goods impose a negative externality on consumers of genuine items, as fakes degrade the status associated with a given label. But counterfeits allow consumers to unbundle the status and quality attributes of the brand-name products, and alter the competition among oligopolistic trademark owners. We analyze two policies designed to combat counterfeiting: enforcement policy which increases the likelihood of confiscation of illegal items, and the imposition of a tariff on low-quality imports.

In industries with imperfect consumer information, the lack of a reputation puts latecomers at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis established firms. We consider whether the existence of such informational barriers to entry provides a valid reason for temporarily protecting infant producers of experience goods and services. Our model incorporates both moral hazard in an individual firm's choice of quality and adverse selection among potential entrants into the industry. We find that infant-industry protection often exacerbates the welfare loss associated with these market imperfections.