This article documents a significant time-series momentum effect that is consistent and robust across all examined conventional asset classes from 1969 to 2015. We find that the duration and magnitude of time-series momentum is different in developed and emerging markets, but this is no longer the case when controlling for the currency component. We further demonstrate that time-series momentum captures a significant proportion of international mutual fund performance, but this is predominantly with respect to its long aspect. Finally, the market interventions by central banks in recent years have distorted correlations across assets; this challenges the performance of such portfolios.

We find a negative relation between firm-level political risk and future delta-hedged equity option returns. A quasi-natural experiment based on Brexit corroborates this finding since after the referendum there is a decrease in the option returns of the positive-Brexit exposure firms. The predictability is driven by the jump risk component of political uncertainty, is more pronounced in periods of high intermediary constraints, and is stronger among high-demand pressure options but weaker among politically active firms. Finally, consistent with a risk-based explanation, investors of options on politically risky firms are compensated with high returns when major unexpected political shocks happen.

We document that value-to-price, the ratio of Residual-Income-Model-based valuation to market price, subsumes the power of book-to-market ratio and many other value or quality measures in predicting stock returns. Long-short value-to-price portfolios hedge against momentum, revitalize the seemingly missing value premium over past decades, and generate significant returns after adjusting for common factors. The value-price-divergence (VPD) factor constructed from the average returns of these portfolios within small and big stocks is not spanned by these known factors. Max Sharpe ratio and constrained R-squared tests reveal that VPD is a better substitute for the traditional value factor and that a four-factor model using the VPD, market, momentum, and size factors outperforms most extant benchmarks in explaining the cross-section of expected equity returns, including value-to-price portfolios as test assets. The findings remain robust under alternative specifications of equity cost of capital.

We document strong time-series momentum effects in individual stocks in the US markets from 1927 to 2017. Time-series momentum is not specific to sub-periods, firm sizes, formation- and holding-period lengths, or geographic markets. The effects persist after controlling for standard risk factors. Time-series momentum effects are conditional on the market state, the information discreteness of the constituent stocks and investor sentiment. We propose two alternative implementations, revised time-series momentum and dual momentum, which generate even higher profits than standard time-series momentum.

We use a simple two-stage dividend growth model to connect profitability growth and firm scale to stock returns. In this framework, both the magnitude and the length of the first-stage growth play a key role in determining returns. Using current profitability growth to estimate magnitude and firm scale as inverse proxy for length, we predict that future returns should increase with current profitability growth but, crucially, the effect should diminish with firm scale. Across a range of empirical tests, we find strong evidence in support of our model determinants and predictions. Our findings are not explained by an array of associated, potentially confounding variables.

We document a systematic seasonal component in the aggregate underperformance of active mutual funds. At the aggregate level, active funds underperform the market and other passive benchmarks only in the first month of a quarter. This intra-quarter performance seasonality holds across fund sizes and investment styles. The pattern is consistent with short-term stock return reversal effects along with aggregate window-dressing and, to a lesser extent, NAV-inflation practices around quarter-ends. We find marginal or no evidence of microstructure biases, fund investor flows, or cash distributions as sources of this seasonality. Our findings highlight new features of the active management underperformance puzzle.