This article investigates the claim that debt finance can increase firm value by curtailing managers' access to 'free cash flow.' The author first shows that incentive contracts that tie the managers' pay to stockholder wealth are often a superior solution to the free cash flow problem. He then considers the possibility that the manager can trade on secondary capital markets. Liquid secondary markets are shown to undermine management incentive schemes and, in many cases, to restore the value of debt finance in controlling the free cash flow problem.
We find that firms protected by “second generation” state antitakeover laws substantially reduce their use of debt, and that unprotected firms do the reverse. This result supports recent models in which the threat of hostile takeover motivates managers to take on debt they would otherwise avoid. An implication is that legal barriers to takeovers may increase corporate slack.
This article investigates the claim that debt finance can increase firm value by curtailing managers' access to “free cash flow.” We first show that incentive contracts that tie the managers' pay to stockholder wealth are often a superior solution to the free cash flow problem. We then consider the possibility that the manager can trade on secondary capital markets. Liquid secondary markets are shown to undermine management incentive schemes and, in many cases, to restore the value of debt finance in controlling the free cash flow problem.
This article investigates the claim that debt finance can increase firm value by curtailing managers' access to “free cash flow.” We first show that incentive contracts that tie the managers' pay to stockholder wealth are often a superior solution to the free cash flow problem. We then consider the possibility that the manager can trade on secondary capital markets. Liquid secondary markets are shown to undermine management incentive schemes and, in many cases, to restore the value of debt finance in controlling the free cash flow problem.
We find that firms protected by “second generation” state antitakeover laws substantially reduce their use of debt, and that unprotected firms do the reverse. This result supports recent models in which the threat of hostile takeover motivates managers to take on debt they would otherwise avoid. An implication is that legal barriers to takeovers may increase corporate slack.
Recent advances in incentive theory stress the multidimensional nature of agent effort and specifically cases where workers affect one anothers' performance through “helping” efforts. This article models helping efforts as determined by the compensation package and task allocation. The model is tested with Australian evidence on reported helping efforts within work groups. The evidence consistently supports the hypothesis that helping efforts are reduced, while individual efforts are increased, when promotion incentives are strong. Piece rates and profit‐sharing appear to have little effect on helping efforts, while task variety and helping efforts are positively correlated.
Worker incentive schemes are invariably assumed to be administered by an owner-entrepreneur who has an incentive to understate worker performance after the event. While tournaments can overcome this problem, they discourage cooperation between workers. We show that a professional manager concerned with equality between workers and with avoiding bankruptcy rather than maximizing shareholder wealth will conduct a tournament that preserves individual effort incentives while promoting cooperation between workers. The theory predicts lower debt levels and more compressed pay scales as cooperation becomes more important. In the limit this becomes a group bonus scheme, supported by "blue-chip" debt.
It is now customary to view the corporation as nexus of explicit and implicit contracts. Governance determines how the firm's top decision makers (executives) actually administer such contracts. We survey recent theory and evidence on executive behaviour and incentives and reject the standard assumption of shareholder-wealth-maximisation, either in its strict sense or in the sense implied by standard principal-agent models. Explanations for this state of affairs as an inefficient, rent-seeking outcome are contrasted with efficiency explanations, particularly those that explicitly consider the diverse claims of employees, customers, and suppliers as well as those of investors.
Gerald T. Garvey, Todd T. Milbourn, EVA versus Earnings: Does It Matter Which Is More Highly Correlated with Stock Returns?, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 38, Supplement: Studies on Accounting Information and the Economics of the Firm (2000), pp. 209-245
Principal-agent theory suggests that a manager should be paid relative to a benchmark that removes the effect of market or sector performance on the firm's own performance. Recently, it has been argued that such indexation is not observed in the data because executives can set pay in their own interests; that is, they can enjoy “pay for luck” as well as “pay for performance.” We first show that this argument is incomplete. The positive expected return on stock markets reflects compensation for bearing systematic risk. If executives’ pay is tied to market movements, they can only expect to receive the market-determined return for risk-bearing. This argument, however, assumes that executive pay is tied to bad luck as well as to good luck. If executives can truly influence the setting of their pay, they will seek to have their performance benchmarked only when it is in their interest, namely, when the benchmark has fallen. Using industry benchmarks, we find significantly less pay for luck when luck is down (in which case, pay for luck would reduce compensation) than when it is up. These empirical results are robust to a variety of alternative hypotheses and robustness checks, and they suggest that the average executive loses 25–45% less pay from bad luck than is gained from good luck.