It is conventionally perceived in the literature that weak analysts are likely to under weight their private information and strategically bias their announcements in the direction of the public beliefs to avoid scenarios where their private information turns out to be wrong, whereas strong analysts tend to adopt an opposite strategy of over weighting their private information and shifting their announcements away from the public beliefs in an attempt to stand out from the crowd. Analyzing a reporting game between two financial analysts, who are compensated based on their relative forecast accuracy, we demonstrate that it could be the other way around. An investigation of the equilibrium in our game suggests that, contrary to the common perception, analysts who benefit from information advantage may strategically choose to understate their exclusive private information and bias their announcements toward the public beliefs, while exhibiting the opposite behavior of overstating their private information when they estimate that their peers are likely to be equally informed.

Fama and French (2006) use the dividend-discount model to develop the role of expected profitability, expected investment, and the book-to-market ratio as predictors of stock returns. One reported empirical result is anomalous. The valuation model establishes that the comparative static relation between expected returns and expected investment is negative, yet it appears to be positive and insignificant. We show that the posited valuation relations apply at the firm level, and not at the per share level at which they were tested. Once the variables are measured at the firm level, all the Fama French predictions are validated.