We investigate the 2008–2009 trade collapse using microdata from a small open economy, Belgium. Belgian exports and imports mostly fell because of smaller quantities sold and unit prices charged rather than fewer firms, trading partners, and products being involved in trade. Our difference-in-difference results point to a fall in the demand for tradables as the main driver of the collapse. Finance and involvement in global value chains played a minor role. Firm-level exports-to-turnover and imports-to-intermediates ratios reveal a comparable collapse of domestic and cross-border operations. Overall, our results reject a crisis of cross-border trade per se.

We investigate how managers help firms grow by entering a new export market. We conduct an event study on the decision to export to Angola using data on Portuguese firms and workers. We evaluate the impact of the presence of managers with experience in exporting to the Angolan market on a firm’s entry success in the aftermath of an exogenous shock: the sudden end of the Angolan civil war. We show that the presence of managers doubles the probability of a firm entering the market. We do not find any significant impact on the intensive margin of exports.

Equilibria and optima generally differ in imperfectly competitive markets. Although this is well understood theoretically, it is unclear how large the welfare distortions are in the aggregate economy. Do they matter quantitatively? To answer this question, we develop a multisector monopolistic competition model with endogenous firm entry and selection, productivity, and markups. Using French and UK data, we quantify the gap between the equilibrium and optimal allocations. We find that inefficiencies in the labor allocation and entry between sectors, as well as inefficient selection and output per firm within sectors, generate welfare losses of about 6%–10% of GDP.

Using employer-employee matched and firm production quantity and input data for Portuguese firms, we study the endogenous response of productivity to firm reorganizations as measured by changes in the number of management layers. We show that, as a result of an exogenous demand or productivity shock that makes the firm reorganize and add a management layer, quantity-based productivity increases by about 6%, while revenue-based productivity drops by around 3%. Such a reorganization makes the firm more productive but also increases the quantity produced to an extent that lowers the price charged by the firm and, as a result, its revenue-based productivity as well.