This paper studies how competition affects firms’ expectations in a new dynamic general equilibrium model with rational inattention and oligopolistic competition where firms acquire information about their competitors’ beliefs. In the model, firms with fewer competitors are less attentive to aggregate variables—a novel prediction supported by survey evidence. A calibrated version of the model matches the relationship between firms’ numbers of competitors and their uncertainty about aggregate inflation as a nontargeted moment. A quantitative exercise reveals that firms’ strategic inattention to aggregates significantly amplifies monetary nonneutrality and shifts output response disproportionately toward less competitive oligopolies by distorting relative prices.

We show that the cyclicality of output growth is a sufficient predictor for the cyclicality of markups in models that micro-found variable markups through dynamic trade-offs. We use data on markups from the U.S. as well as survey data on firms’ expectations from New Zealand to test the predictions of these models and find evidence in favor of their mechanisms. Finally, we study the implications of these mechanisms for cyclicality of markups in a calibrated general equilibrium model. In particular, we find that the degree of hump-shaped response in output is crucial for the direction of aggregate markup cyclicality.

We develop a model that integrates modern theories of labor market flows with nominal wage rigidities to study the consequences of inflation on the labor market. Nominal wage stickiness incentivizes workers to engage in job-to-job transitions after an unexpected increase in the price level. Such dynamics lead to a rise in aggregate vacancies associating a seemingly tight labor market with lower real wages—two facts observed during the recent inflation period. The calibrated model jointly matches aggregate and cross-sectional trends in worker flows and wages during the 2021–2024 period. Using historical data, we show that prior periods of high inflation were also associated with increasing vacancies and upward shifts in the Beveridge curve. Our results suggest that policy makers and academics should be cautious about viewing the rise in the vacancy-to-unemployment rate as a sign of a tight labor market during inflationary periods without holistically looking at other labor market indicators.

This paper studies the implications of central bank credibility for long-run inflation and inflation dynamics. We introduce central bank lack of commitment into a standard nonlinear New Keynesian economy with sticky-price monopolistically competitive firms. Inflation is driven by the interaction of lack of commitment and the economic environment. We show that long-run inflation increases following an unanticipated permanent increase in the labor wedge or decrease in the elasticity of substitution across varieties. In the transition, inflation overshoots and then gradually declines. Quantitatively, inflation overshooting is persistent, and the welfare loss from lack of commitment relative to inflation targeting is large.

We investigate biases in expectations across different settings through a large-scale randomized experiment where participants forecast stable stochastic processes. The experiment allows us to control forecasters’ information sets as well as the data-generating process, so we can cleanly measure biases in beliefs. We report three facts. First, forecasts display significant overreaction to the most recent observation. Second, overreaction is stronger for less persistent processes. Third, overreaction is also stronger for longer forecast horizons. We develop a tractable model of expectations formation with costly processing of past information, which closely fits the empirical facts. We also perform additional experiments to test the mechanism of the model.

Using randomized control trials (RCTs) applied over time in different countries, we study whether the economic environment affects how agents learn from new information. We show that as inflation rose in advanced economies, both households and firms became more attentive and informed about publicly available news about inflation, leading them to respond less to exogenously provided information about inflation and monetary policy. We also study the effects of RCTs in countries where inflation has been consistently high (Uruguay) and low (New Zealand) as well as what happens when the same agents are repeatedly provided information in both low‐ and high‐inflation environments (Italy). Our results broadly support models in which inattention is an endogenous outcome that depends on the economic environment.