In this paper, we investigate whether listed firms in China adjust their capital structure in response to an increase in the corporate tax rate. Although theories of capital structure suggest that corporate tax is an important determinant of capital structure, how exogenous changes of the tax rate affect firms’ leverage decisions has not been fully explored. We examine a unique circumstance in which the Chinese government increased the corporate tax rate of firms that had previously received local government tax rebates. The evidence indicates that these firms increased their leverage when the corporate tax rate increased. Further investigation suggests that the adjustment of leverage was mostly driven by firms with a high level of access to bank loans.

We study the relationship between the amount of managed earnings and firms’ earnings performance and expected growth in a reporting model, where managers manipulate earnings to influence the valuation of firms’ equity while bearing a cost that is increasing and convex in the amount of managed earnings. In the unique revealing equilibrium to the model, firms with higher performance and growth over-report earnings by a larger amount because price responsiveness increases with earnings performance and growth. And earnings quality, defined as the proportion of true economic earnings in total reported earnings, increases with earnings performance but decreases with earnings growth. We conduct empirical tests on a large sample and a restatement sample using different proxies for earnings management. Results from the large sample tests support our predictions while results from the restatement sample tests are mixed. Our study provides an alternative explanation to the positive relationship between discretionary accruals estimated from the Jones model and firms’ performance and growth.

Previous studies show that in contrast to evidence that share issue privatization (SIP) in most other countries have improved firm profitability, China’s SIP of the 1990s had no such effect. We argue that the main reason for the failure of China’s SIP is likely to have been the weak institutional environment in place at that time. We examine China’s SIP in a more recent period in which the institutional environment was greatly improved. Using a matching sample method, we find that SIP firms continued to experience negative post-SIP profitability changes in our sample period. However, their performance decline was significantly less than that of their matched non-SIP SOEs. We also find that the introduction of the independent director rule helped to improve firm performance. Our results reconcile the findings of the SIP effect in China with international evidence and illustrate the importance of a developed capital market to ensuring the success of privatization schemes.

The distribution of power in the political system shapes the financial reporting opacity of banks. Specifically, banks located in states with senators on the Senate Banking Committee (BC senators) have greater abnormal loan loss provisions than banks in other states. The result is stronger for larger banks and banks with higher risk. In addition, BC senators have a negative effect on the likelihood of banks in their home states receiving enforcement actions, and, more importantly, this effect is stronger for more opaque banks. These findings suggest that politicians, regulators, and banks use opaque financial reporting to facilitate regulatory forbearance. Moreover, we show that opacity is a significant channel through which BC senators increase bank risk. During economic downturns, however, BC senators appear to promote bank opacity to encourage bank lending and create liquidity. Finally, the capital market does not penalize the reporting opacity of banks in states with BC senators.

In this paper, we investigate the problem of controlling shareholder Non-Operational Fund Occupancy (NOFO) in China, where controlling shareholders directly take funds away from listed firms without matching business transactions. The NOFO problem was an evident and widely used tunneling activity in China and was identified by the securities market regulators. Unlike previous literature that used indirect measures of tunneling, we directly collect the actual amounts of NOFO from mandated disclosures and utilize this direct measure of tunneling in a series of empirical tests. First, we examine and find that various mechanisms such as ownership structure, corporate governance and institutional environments could restrain tunneling activities. Second, we find significantly positive market reactions to regulations that aimed to solve the NOFO problem. Third, we find evidence that the operating performance and valuation of firms with a NOFO problem improved after the regulations went into effect. Our study sheds light on the severe issue of minority shareholder expropriation and the effectiveness of regulators' policy to remedy the tunneling problem.

We examine the impact of China's anti‐corruption campaign on firm‐level financial reporting quality (FRQ). As an important component of the anti‐corruption campaign, in October 2013, “Rule 18” was issued to prohibit party and government officials from serving as directors for publicly listed firms. The regulation led to a large number of official directors resigning from their roles as directors involuntarily. As such, Rule 18 has effectively weakened, if not fully discontinued, the political connections of the firms that previously hired officials as directors. Our empirical analyses employ a difference‐in‐differences research design with firm fixed effects and propensity‐score matching to examine the pre‐ and post‐period FRQ around the enactment of Rule 18. We find that, compared to propensity‐score‐matched control firms, FRQ of firms with resigned official directors increases after Rule 18. Further evidence suggests that the impact is stronger when firms are located in regions with more developed financial markets and in regions with higher judiciary efficiency. We also find that the effect is more pronounced when firms are non‐state‐owned, received preferential credits, and face refinancing pressure.

We investigate the role of national culture in corporate risk-taking. We postulate that culture influences corporate risk-taking both through its effect on managerial decision-making and through its effect on a country's formal institutions. Further, we postulate that the influence of culture is conditioned on the extent of managerial discretion as measured by earnings discretion and firm size. Using firm-level data from 35 countries and employing a hierarchical linear modeling approach to isolate the effects of firm-level and country-level variables, we show that individualism has a positive and significant association, whereas uncertainty avoidance and harmony have negative and significant associations, with corporate risk-taking. Greater earnings discretion strengthens and larger firm size weakens the association of culture with corporate risk-taking. We conclude that even in a highly globalized world with sophisticated managers, culture matters.

We examine how public enforcement and private enforcement interact to contain self‐dealing activities in emerging markets. Using data from China, we find that firms receiving comment letters concerning related party transactions (RPTs) from stock exchanges significantly reduce their RPTs in subsequent years. We further find that (1) the subsequent reduction in RPTs is more pronounced when independent directors have higher career or reputation concerns and (2) independent directors are more likely to dissent or resign if their firms do not significantly reduce RPTs after receiving RPT comment letters, especially if they have high reputation concerns. Our study sheds light on a within‐firm mechanism through which public enforcement takes effect. Our empirical findings also illustrate how “sunshine enforcement”—maintaining timely transparency of the enforcement process—can significantly enhance the effectiveness of regulatory programs.

We analyze whether the organizational structure of firms (i.e., whether a firm is diversified or focused) affects their cash holdings. Using Compustat firm level and segment-level data, we find that diversified firms hold significantly less cash than their focused counterparts. Our results are robust to industry adjustments at the segment level and to different factors previously found to be important determinants of cash holdings. Using time-series, cross-sectional, and additional robustness tests we are able to attribute the lower cash holdings among diversified firms to complementary growth opportunities across the different segments of these firms and the availability of active internal capital markets. We find that the other theories that rely on the potentially effective use of asset sales of non-core segments of diversified firms to generate cash, and the increased agency/influence costs in diversified firms do not offer an economically significant explanation for the lower cash holdings among diversified firms.