We hypothesize that short selling has a disciplining role vis-à-vis firm managers that forces them to reduce earnings management. Using firm-level short-selling data for thirty-three countries collected over a sample period from 2002 to 2009, we document a significantly negative relationship between the threat of short selling and earnings management. Tests based on instrumental variable and exogenous regulatory experiments offer evidence of a causal link between short selling and earnings management. Our findings suggest that short selling functions as an external governance mechanism to discipline managers.

The Russell 1000 and 2000 stock indexes comprise the first 1000 and next 2000 largest firms ranked by market capitalization. Small changes in the capitalizations of firms ranked near 1000 move them between these indexes. Because the indexes are value-weighted, more money tracks the largest stocks in the Russell 2000 than the smallest in the Russell 1000. Using this discontinuity, we find that additions to the Russell 2000 result in price increases and deletions result in price declines. We then identify time trends in indexing effects and the types of funds that provide liquidity to indexers.

We develop an optimal tax-timing model that takes into account asymmetric long-term and short-term tax rates for positive capital gains and limited tax deductibility of capital losses. In contrast to the existing literature, this model can help explain why many investors not only defer short-term capital losses to long term but also defer large long-term capital gains and losses. Because the benefit of tax deductibility of capital losses increases with the short-term tax rates, effective tax rates can decrease as short-term capital gains tax rates increase.

We examine the impact of managerial entrenchment on firm value using a dynamic model with firm fixed effects. To estimate the model, we employ the long-difference technique, which is shown by our simulation to deliver the least biased estimates. Based on a large sample of U.S. companies, we document a significantly negative and causal effect of managerial entrenchment on firm value after taking into account omitted variables, reverse causality, and highly persistent endogenous variables. Additional analysis suggests that the causality running from managerial entrenchment to firm value is more pronounced than that for reverse causality.

We analyze the sales method for a sample of 575 acquisitions announced between 1998 and 2012 and find that targets choose auctions to maximize the target takeover premium through greater competition and to relax their financial constraints. Auctions, compared to negotiated deals, are associated with significantly higher target announcement returns, especially for relatively small targets. Bidder returns are positively related to auctions for bidders acquiring relatively small targets, not for the full sample. Taking into account size differences, we find that auctions, decrease target gains and increase bidder gains expressed in dollars.

Using monthly loan-level data, individual partial prepayments (curtailments) from January 2001 to June 2011 are observed for mortgages in twenty metropolitan statistical areas. Contrary to some earlier assertions, American homeowners now frequently commit funds towards their mortgage payments in excess of the amount due; over 30% of loans outstanding have made at least one curtailment payment. After controlling for borrower and loan-level variables, we show that the latent propensity to curtail has steadily risen from 2003 to 2006 and remains at elevated levels. Therefore, curtailment provides an example of consumer deleveraging behavior that began prior to the Great Recession.

We study the cyclical properties of sales, regular price changes, and average prices paid by consumers (“effective” prices) using data on prices and quantities sold for numerous retailers across many US metropolitan areas. Inflation in the effective prices paid by consumers declines significantly with higher unemployment while little change occurs in the inflation rate of prices posted by retailers. This difference reflects the reallocation of household expenditures across retailers, a feature of the data which we document and quantify, rather than sales. We propose a simple model with household store-switching and assess its implications for business cycles and policymakers.

The Russell 1000 and 2000 stock indexes comprise the first 1000 and next 2000 largest firms ranked by market capitalization. Small changes in the capitalizations of firms ranked near 1000 move them between these indexes. Because the indexes are value-weighted, more money tracks the largest stocks in the Russell 2000 than the smallest in the Russell 1000. Using this discontinuity, we find that additions to the Russell 2000 result in price increases and deletions result in price declines. We then identify time trends in indexing effects and the types of funds that provide liquidity to indexers.

We compare clientele and information share in weekly- (Weeklys) and monthly-expiring options (Monthlys) on the S&P 500 index. Striking dissimilarities between the two instruments are found, most apparent being the much smaller trade size and substantially higher implied volatility in Weeklys, consistent with both speculation and event trading. Additionally, the price discovery contribution of Weeklys, albeit modest when compared to the underlying index itself, is substantially larger than that of Monthlys. The cumulative evidence points to an increasingly segmented options market. Thus, studies employing only standard options to investigate price discovery will likely underestimate the informational role of options.

We hypothesize that short selling has a disciplining role vis-à-vis firm managers that forces them to reduce earnings management. Using firm-level short-selling data for thirty-three countries collected over a sample period from 2002 to 2009, we document a significantly negative relationship between the threat of short selling and earnings management. Tests based on instrumental variable and exogenous regulatory experiments offer evidence of a causal link between short selling and earnings management. Our findings suggest that short selling functions as an external governance mechanism to discipline managers.