This paper studies the effect of risk-taking incentives provided by option compensation on corporate debt maturity choices. The Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 123R is used as a quasi-natural experiment to establish causality. FAS 123R requires firms to expense stock options at fair value, which has resulted in a dramatic reduction in option compensation and managerial risk-taking incentives. We find that treated firms significantly increased debt maturity relative to control firms. Further tests identify that the alleviation of creditor-shareholder agency conflicts due to the adoption of FAS 123R is the underlying mechanism driving the result.

Abstract The global ETF industry provides more complicated investment vehicles than low-cost index trackers. Instead, we find that the real investments of ETFs may deviate from their benchmarks to leverage informational advantages (which leads to a surprising stock-selection ability) and to help affiliated OEFs through cross-trading. These effects are more prevalent in ETFs domiciled in Europe. Moreover, ETF flows seem to respond to additional risk. These results have important normative implications for consumer protection and financial stability. Received March 18, 2017; Editorial decision October 14, 2018 by Editor Raman Uppal. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

We infer the latent social networks of investors using data on their stock holdings. We map linkages to portfolio weights using a portfolio-choice model. The precision of an investor’s private signal about firm value is assumed to increase with his connections in the city where the firm is headquartered. Using money-manager data, we find that managerial linkages to a city are overly dispersed relative to the Erdös–Rényi model of i.i.d. connections. Managers at the tail of this distribution with non-i.i.d. linkages have more university alumni in that city. Their stock holdings there outperform their holdings in other cities.

We model an investment bank's choice of resource allocation by the probability of acquirers' mergers and acquisitions frequency in the future to theoretically link the role of investment banks to the acquirer returns. Our model predicts the heterogeneity in the quality of advisory services provided by the same investment bank that leads to the heterogeneity in acquirer returns. Such heterogeneity declines as the likelihood of an industry merger wave rises. Controlling for investment bank fixed effects, acquirer fixed effects and potential self-selection bias, we find empirical evidence supporting our hypotheses.

Measuring the value of labor-market hires for stock prices, be it underwriters when firms go public (IPOs) or chief executive officers (CEOs), is difficult due to selection. Opaque firms with higher costs of capital benefit more from prestigious underwriters, while productive firms benefit more from talented CEOs. Using assignment models, we show that the importance of talent (or agent heterogeneity) relative to selection (or firm heterogeneity) is measured by wage increases across agents of different compensation ranks divided by changes in output across their firms. The median of this ratio is 0.5% for underwriters and 2% for CEOs.

Active corporate executives are a popular source of independent directors. Although their knowledge, expertise, and network can bring value to firms on whose boards they sit, independent executive directors may be more likely to be distracted than other directors due to their outside executive roles. Using newly constructed data linking independent directors to their employers, we identify periods when employers' poor performance may distract them from board service. We find that firms with distracted independent executive directors have lower performance and value, higher CEO compensation, reduced CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, lower earnings quality, and lower M&A performance. These adverse effects are mainly driven by distracted directors who sit on relevant committees, and are stronger for small boards.

This article analyzes how creditors’ simultaneous debt and equity holdings affect firm investment policies. We find that firms with dual ownership are less likely to have capital expenditure restrictions in loan contracts, and the relation varies in predicted ways with the monitoring needs of borrowers and the monitoring capacity of dual owners. A less frequent use of capital expenditure restrictions, however, does not result in borrowers’ risk-shifting. Dual ownership firms are also more likely to be granted an unconditional waiver and do not significantly reduce debt issuance or investment expenditures after a financial covenant violation. Our results highlight how dual ownership can help mitigate shareholder–creditor conflicts.

We present evidence of investors underreacting to the absence of events in financial markets. Routine-based insiders strategically choose to be silent when they possess private information not yet reflected in stock prices. Consistent with our hypothesis, insider silence following a routine sell (buy) predicts positive (negative) future returns, as well as fundamentals. The return predictability of insider silence is stronger among firms with a poor information environment and facing higher arbitrage costs, and a large fraction of abnormal returns concentrates on future earnings announcements. A long–short strategy that exploits insiders’ strategic silence behavior generates abnormal returns of 6% to 10% annually.

We address how using different censoring thresholds and imputation procedures affects the baseline results of Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Hong (2015). Higher censoring thresholds introduce measure ment error and outliers that generate wide variability in results across weighting schemes, but methods that explicitly control for outliers confirm the results of Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Hong (2015) for all censoring thresholds. We also illustrate how the BLS’s approach to imputing missing prices can introduce a cyclical bias into measures of posted price inflation when store-switching is present in the data. (JEL D12, E31, E32, L25, L81)

This study attempts to reconcile the conflicting theoretical predictions regarding how government ownership affects bank capital behaviour. Using a unique Chinese bank dataset over 2006–2015 we find that government-owned banks have higher target capital ratios and adjust these ratios faster compared to private banks, supporting the ‘development/political’ view of the government’s role in banking. This effect is stronger for local government-owned and state enterprise-owned banks than for central government-owned banks. We also find that undercapitalized government-owned banks increase equity while undercapitalized foreign banks contract assets and liabilities as their respective main strategy to adjust their capital ratios.