By examining required rates of return, we study how shareholders perceive stronger stakeholder orientation arising under the adoption of constituency statutes. Constituency statutes decrease (increase) the cost of equity for firms operating in high- (low-) competition industries. For firms in high-competition industries, constituency statutes increase future cash flows and performance resilience to negative industry downturns, suggesting that constituency statutes facilitate CSR activities for product differentiation in competitive industries. In contrast, for firms in low-competition industries, constituency statutes reduce future cash flows and increase tail risks, suggesting that constituency statutes shield managerial agency problems from discipline.

We document that firms prefer counties with higher ethnic diversity in locating their interstate investments, especially for those pursuing innovation, seeking to establish service centers, or managing a diverse workforce. We also find some evidence that interstate investment in high ethnic diversity locations results in increased patent applications, sales growth, positive media coverage, and overall operating performance. Taken together, we show that firms prefer to invest in ethnically diverse locations as they recognize the potential benefits of leveraging a diverse labor supply, such as enhancing problem-solving, innovation, and performance. We must recognize that difference is a reason for celebration and growth, rather than a reason for destruction. (Audre Lorde)

During the 2020–2021 “AAPI Hate,” mutual funds led by female managers perceived as East Asian underperformed relative to other female managers. This effect is stronger in states with higher anti-Asian animus, among more actively managed funds, and when these managers hold sole or senior roles. Factors concurrent with COVID-19, including childcare challenges, concerns for overseas families, marketplace and workplace discrimination, and exposure to the Chinese economy, cannot explain the effect. Underperformance is traceable to poor stock picking due to impairments in generating private information. Racial-ethnic animosity, even outside workplace or marketplace, hinders productivity and decision-making in high-skill professions.

Leveraging the China Securities Regulatory Commission’s annual random inspection exercise as a quasi-natural experiment, we document that the risk scrutiny of preventive regulatory enforcement creates regulatory uncertainty about inspected firms to business partners, leading them to reduce the provision of trade credit. Reduced access to trade credit is more pronounced for firms with weak bargaining power, high opacity, or low financial resilience. Reduced access is also evident in both ‘compliant’ and non-compliant firms, though the reduction gradually subsides as uncertainty dissipates in different ways for the two types of inspected firms. Our findings uncover an important unintended effect of preventive regulation and have implications for policy making.