Regulation G requires all companies to quantitatively reconcile pro forma earnings with GAAP earnings. This paper provides three findings related to the impact of reconciliations on mispricing of pro forma earnings. First, prior to Reg G, we find that mispricing of pro forma earnings is limited to firms with low reconciliation quality. There is no evidence of mispricing for firms with high reconciliation quality. Second, we find no evidence of mispricing after Reg G. Third, there is a cross-Reg G reduction of mispricing for firms whose reconciliation quality improves, and there continues to be no mispricing for firms that have high reconciliation quality both before and after Reg G. Together, our results support the notion that better reconciliations reduce the extent of mispricing.

Reported earnings per share (EPS) are frequently rounded to the nearest cent. This paper provides evidence that firms manipulate earnings so that they can round-up and report one more cent of EPS. Specifically, we examine the digit immediately right of the decimal in the calculated EPS number expressed in cents. Evidence is presented that firms are more likely to round-up when managers ex ante expect rounding-up to meet analysts’ forecasts, report positive profits, or sustain recent performance. Further investigation provides evidence that working capital accruals are used to round-up EPS.

Our study reveals that financial analysts issue more pessimistic forecasts for their investment banking clients' competitors than for unrelated firms. Our evidence is consistent with this behavior stemming from analysts' strategic incentives rather than their true beliefs. We find that analysts' pessimism for the client's competitors is more pronounced when the client is more important to analysts' brokerage houses, when high uncertainty prevents competitors from detecting analysts' strategic motives, and when analysts' brokerage houses are less prestigious. Additionally, we explore the economic consequences of the pessimism from the perspectives of the covered firms, brokerage houses, and financial analysts. Finally, we consider the impact of the 2003 Global Analyst Research Settlement. Overall, our results demonstrate that issuing pessimistic forecasts for clients' competitors is an understudied channel through which analysts curry favor with their investment banking clients.

We investigate whether individual securities regulators exhibit personal styles in their work, a question of importance to corporate executives and capital market participants. Using the SEC's comment letters as our setting, we find that SEC staff members exhibit unique personal “styles.” We manually collect information on SEC staff members and provide evidence that staff members' personal characteristics influence the SEC's review process. Further analyses reveal that SEC staff members with a CPA qualification are associated with a lower likelihood of future accounting restatements; moreover, similarity between the SEC staff member and the firm's correspondent is associated with lower scrutiny intensity. Overall, our study offers evidence that SEC staff members exhibit individual differences and that their styles shape the SEC's enforcement actions. Our results offer implications for the working of securities regulators.

We hypothesize that the arrival of star analysts improves the performance of incumbent financial analysts, while the departure of star analysts has the opposite effect. Our results consistent with this hypothesis are concentrated primarily in the tests related to star arrivals. Our findings are robust to an instrumental variable approach and a falsification test. In addition, we hypothesize that the impact of the arrival/departure of star analysts is more pronounced when the star analyst covers the same industry as the incumbents (especially for industries with high uncertainty), when the star analyst is more established, when the incumbent analysts are less experienced, and when the brokerage house has fewer existing star analysts. Overall, our paper offers evidence of peer effects among financial analysts, mainly through the arrival of star analysts.

Capital gains taxation creates a lock-in effect, increasing investors' incentives to monitor and decreasing portfolio firms' incentives to cater to short-term investors. We show a negative relation between lock-in and portfolio firms' earnings management, and this relation is stronger for capital gains held by tax-sensitive investors. Further, the relation between lock-in and earnings management is stronger when the capital gains tax rate is higher. We show that locked-in funds vote against management and against audit committee members' reappointment following earnings management. Locked-in funds are less likely to exit a position following disappointing earnings announcements, reducing firms' incentive to manage earnings.