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Liquidity Black Holes

Review of Finance 2004 8(1), 1-18 open access
Traders with short horizons and privately known loss limits interact in a market for a risky asset. Risk-averse, long horizon traders generate a downward sloping residual demand curve that faces the short-horizon traders. When the price falls close to the loss limits of the short horizon traders, selling of the risky asset by any trader increases the incentives for others to sell. Sales become mutually reinforcing among the short term traders, and payoffs analogous to a bank run are generated. A “liquidity black hole” is the analogue of the run outcome in a bank run model. Short horizon traders sell because others sell. Using global game techniques, we solve for the unique trigger point at which the liquidity black hole comes into existence. Empirical implications include the sharp V-shaped pattern in prices around the time of the liquidity black hole.

The impact of risk regulation on price dynamics

Journal of Banking & Finance 2004 28(5), 1069-1087 open access
Most financial risk regulations assume that asset returns are exogenous, where risk is estimated from historical data. This assumption fails to take into account the feedback effect of trading decisions on prices. We investigate the consequences of risk constrained trading by means of simulations of a general equilibrium model with a value-at-risk constraint and compare the results to the case when risk constraints are not present. Prices are lower on average in the presence of risk regulation, while volatility is higher. Risk regulation may have the perverse effect of exacerbating price fluctuations.

Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders

Review of Economic Studies 2004 71(1), 87-113
Do large investors increase the vulnerability of a country to speculative attacks in the foreign exchange markets? To address this issue, we build a model of currency crises where a single large investor and a continuum of small investors independently decide whether to attack a currency based on their private information about fundamentals. Even abstracting from signalling, the presence of the large investor does make all other traders more aggressive in their selling. Relative to the case in which there is no large investor, small investors attack the currency when fundamentals are stronger. Yet, the difference can be small, or non-existent, depending on the relative precision of private information of the small and large investors. Adding signalling makes the influence of the large trader on small traders' behaviour much stronger.