Several studies suggest that a firm distress risk factor could be behind the size and the book-to-market effects. A natural proxy for firm distress is bankruptcy risk. If bankruptcy risk is systematic, one would expect a positive association between bankruptcy risk and subsequent realized returns. However, results demonstrate that bankruptcy risk is not rewarded by higher returns. Thus, a distress factor is unlikely to account for the size and book-to-market effects. Surprisingly, firms with high bankruptcy risk earn lower than average returns since 1980. A risk-based explanation cannot fully explain the anomalous evidence.

The existing literature typically does not differentiate between security returns and the returns of investors in these securities. This study clarifies that investor and security returns differ because of the timing and magnitude of investor capital flows into and out of these securities. The empirical results indicate that actual investor returns are systematically lower than buy-and-hold returns for nearly all major international stock markets. These results imply that the historical equity premium and the cost of equity capital are likely lower than previously thought.

Several studies suggest that a firm distress risk factor could be behind the size and the book‐to‐market effects. A natural proxy for firm distress is bankruptcy risk. If bankruptcy risk is systematic, one would expect a positive association between bankruptcy risk and subsequent realized returns. However, results demonstrate that bankruptcy risk is not rewarded by higher returns. Thus, a distress factor is unlikely to account for the size and book‐to‐market effects. Surprisingly, firms with high bankruptcy risk earn lower than average returns since 1980. A risk‐based explanation cannot fully explain the anomalous evidence.

This study explores whether NielsenIQ scanner data from U.S. retailers contain incremental information about the GAAP revenue of corresponding manufacturers. Using retail product/store/week data from 2006 to 2018, we construct a measure of aggregated consumer purchases at the manufacturer/quarter level, and find that it strongly predicts GAAP revenues. In addition, analyst forecasts of revenues have predictable errors, which implies that analysts do not fully incorporate the information in consumer purchases. Exploring investment implications, we find that hedge portfolios that buy (sell) stocks of firms with high (low) abnormal consumer purchases generate annualized returns on the magnitude of 14%–19%, depending on specification. Overall, these findings suggest that scanner data on consumer purchases provide an information edge over GAAP revenue, shedding light on the benefits of using transactional data.

Survey evidence indicates widely held managerial beliefs that earnings volatility is negatively related to earnings predictability. In addition, existing research suggests that earnings volatility is determined by economic and accounting factors, and both of these factors reduce earnings predictability. We find that the consideration of earnings volatility brings substantial improvements in the prediction of both short- and long-term earnings. Conditioning on volatility information also allows one to identify systematic errors in analyst forecasts, which implies that analysts do not fully understand the implications of earnings volatility for earnings predictability.

The returns of hedge fund investors depend not only on the returns of the funds they hold but also on the timing and magnitude of their capital flows in and out of these funds. We use dollar-weighted returns (a form of Internal Rate of Return (IRR)) to assess the properties of actual investor returns on hedge funds and compare them to buy-and-hold fund returns. Our main finding is that annualized dollar-weighted returns are on the magnitude of 3% to 7% lower than corresponding buy-and-hold fund returns. Using factor models of risk and the estimated dollar-weighted performance gap, we find that the real alpha of hedge fund investors is close to zero. In absolute terms, dollar-weighted returns are reliably lower than the return on the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 index, and are only marginally higher than the risk-free rate as of the end of 2008. The combined impression from these results is that the return experience of hedge fund investors is much worse than previously thought.

We use Dealscan , a database of private corporate lending agreements, to provide large–sample tests of the debt covenant hypothesis. Dealscan offers several advantages over the data available in previous studies, principally larger and more representative samples and the availability of extensive actual covenant detail. These advantages allow us to construct powerful tests in which we find clear support for the debt covenant hypothesis. We also use these data to provide broad evidence on the economic role of debt covenants. We find that private lenders set debt covenants tightly and use them as “trip wires” for borrowers, that technical violations occur relatively often, and that violations are not necessarily associated with financial distress. Finally, since we measure covenant slack directly, we report evidence that the extensively–used leverage variable is a relatively noisy proxy for closeness to covenants.

We present a theory that poor matching manifests as noise in the economic relation of advancing expenses to earn revenues. As a result, poor matching decreases the correlation between contemporaneous revenues and expenses, increases earnings volatility, decreases earnings persistence, and induces a negative autocorrelation in earnings changes. The empirical tests document these effects in a sample of the 1,000 largest U.S. firms over the last 40 years. We find a clear and economically substantial trend of declining contemporaneous correlation between revenues and expenses, increased volatility of earnings, declining persistence of earnings, and increased negative autocorrelation in earnings changes. The combined evidence suggests that accounting matching has become worse over time and that this trend has a pronounced effect on the properties of the resulting earnings. This evidence also suggests that the standard-setters’ stated goal of moving away from matching and toward more fair-value accounting is likely to continue and deepen the identified trends in the properties of earnings.

This paper suggests a new measure of one aspect of the quality of working capital accruals and earnings. One role of accruals is to shift or adjust the recognition of cash flows over time so that the adjusted numbers (earnings) better measure firm performance. However, accruals require assumptions and estimates of future cash flows. We argue that the quality of accruals and earnings is decreasing in the magnitude of estimation error in accruals. We derive an empirical measure of accrual quality as the residuals from firm-specific regressions of changes in working capital on past, present, and future operating cash flows. We document that observable firm characteristics can be used as instruments for accrual quality (e.g., volatility of accruals and volatility of earnings). Finally, we show that our measure of accrual quality is positively related to earnings persistence.