This paper analyzes the effect of uncertainty about the mean return on the risky asset on the portfolio decisions of an investor who has a long investment horizon. Building on the earlier work of Detemple (1986), Dothan and Feldman (1986), and Gennotte (1986), it is shown that the possibility of future learning about the mean return on the risky asset induces the investor to take a larger or smaller position in the risky asset than she would if there were no learning, the direction of the effect depending on whether the investor is more or less risk tolerant than the logarithmic investor whose portfolio decisions are unaffected by the possibility of future learning. Numerical calculations show that uncertainty about the mean return on the market portfolio has a significant effect on the portfolio decision of an investor with a 20 year horizon if her assessment of the market risk premium is based solely on the Ibbotson and Sinquefield (1995) data.

This paper studies the origins of an import substitution strategy of development, summarizes the consequences of that strategy, and reviews the problems that led to its failure. The fundamental difficulty was its discouragement of the indigenous social learning necessary for sustained, independent development. The emergence of an outward-oriented, minimal-government strategy is due to the success of Korea and Taiwan. This strategy fails to recognize that social learning requires a strong role for national agents and that this role can be penalized by undue openness. An effective strategy must protect and induce domestic learning without penalizing exporting.

Evolutionary game theory provides an answer to two of the central questions in economic modeling: when is it reasonable to assume that people are rational? And, when is it reasonable to assume that behavior is part of a Nash equilibrium (and if it is reasonable, which equilibrium)? The traditional answers are not compelling, and much of evolutionary modeling is motivated by the need for a better answer. Evolutionary game theory suggests that, in a range of settings, agents do (eventually) play a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, evolutionary modeling has shed light on the relative plausibility of different Nash equilibria.

This paper proposes and implements a security design framework to assess why corporate managers issue convertible debt. We examine three theories that make predictions about the design of convertible debt. Our results suggest that some issuers design convertible debt to mitigate asset substitution problems, while others design it to reduce adverse selection problems. We also find that issuers vary convertible debt security design over the business cycle in response to time variation in asset substitution and adverse selection problems. Overall, the results indicate that corporate managers actively alter convertible debt security design to mitigate costly external finance problems. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: G32

Auditing, Going-concern opinion, Auditor's Loss function, Auditor incentives

Taxation, Foreign Tax Credits, Capital structure, Financing policy

We attempt to further characterize the search strategies of the employer. In the article, we discuss how characteristics of the employer or conditions that the employer faces affect the optimal search strategies and the probability of filling a vacancy in each period. Semiparametric and parametric methods are used to estimate hazard rates of filling vacancies. The results suggest that for the given sample of vacancies, the general form of the hazard function is nonmonotonic. Additionally, the results suggest that those employers who have advance notice of the vacancy may search longer than those employers who do not.