Complex financial statement misstatements that are difficult to diagnose are likely to be described by multiple cues that individually appear innocuous, but that together form an ominous pattern. Because individual auditors are likely to obtain only some of the cues forming the pattern, it is important to understand how well auditors interpret incomplete cue patterns. In this paper, I examine experimentally whether industry-specialist auditors develop problem representations about a seeded misstatement to facilitate interpretation of incomplete patterns. Overall, I find that matched specialists (i.e., those working in their industry) are able to interpret and fill in partialcue patterns, whereas mismatched specialists do not recognize the implications of even full patterns. Matched specialists respond to a partial-cue pattern that potentially indicates misstatement by developing more complete problem representations about the seeded misstatement, assessing higher risk of misstatement, and suggesting procedures that will be efficient and effective at discriminating the presence of the seeded misstatement. Despite higher assessments of misstatement risk when receiving a partial-cue pattern, mismatched specialists' problem representations are impoverished and suggested procedures do not indicate a focus on the seeded misstatement.

Auditors experience difficulty auditing accounts for which it is difficult to identify in advance all the evidence necessary to perform an effective audit. These accounts are challenging because they commonly require auditors to collect additional, relevant evidence in response to new information received during evidence collection. We address this experimentally by examining whether changing the focus of audit programs from plan-focused (i.e., focused on the planned audit procedures) to goal-focused (i.e., focused on the task goal) improves auditors' collection of relevant evidence that is not identifiable at audit program creation. We expect goal-focused auditors to remain open to more ways to achieve their goal. Consequently, we expect and find that goal-focused auditors collect more effective evidence than plan-focused auditors and follow up more effectively on this evidence. This suggests that a goal-focused approach improves audit quality on tasks requiring auditors to flexibly respond to new information.

Auditors and regulators have invested heavily in improving audits of estimates in recent years, but problems in this area persist. We examine the causes of these problems and why they persist. To do so, we interview 24 very experienced auditors about how they audit complex accounting estimates such as fair values and impairments and what problems they experience in the process. We find that auditors overwhelmingly choose to audit the details of management's estimate rather than use other allowable approaches. The steps auditors describe and the language they use to describe those steps indicate that they follow a process of verifying individual elements of management's assertions on a piecemeal basis, resulting in overreliance on management's process, rather than engaging in a critical analysis of the overall estimate. The problems that auditors identify are consistent with this view, and include failures to notice inconsistencies among the estimate and other internal data or external conditions and overreliance on specialists to identify, evaluate, and challenge critical assumptions. We interpret these processes and problems using institutional theory and identify two root causes: standards' and firm policies' emphasis on verifying management's model, and audit firms' division of knowledge between auditors and specialists. Institutional theory proposes these conventions arise from firms extending use of procedures that are legitimate in one area (i.e., auditing accounts without significant uncertainty) to a new area (i.e., auditing complex estimates), even though they are likely less effective in the new area. These conventions are reinforced by regulators' method of inspection and by firms' reluctance to change methods without a prompt to change to a clearly better method. We argue that these institutionalized conventions thwart auditors' good‐faith attempts to engage in skeptical analysis of estimates. Thus, audit quality problems are likely to persist.

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) recently suggested that auditors' lack of specific fraud planning documentation has led auditors to devote insufficient attention to fraud risks in subsequent audit work. Guided by Support Theory, we experimentally investigate how the specificity of fraud risk documentation during audit planning influences auditors' subsequent audit work. We also examine the effect of priming auditors about the fraud risks identified during planning before they begin subsequent evidence evaluation. We find that auditors' planning stage efforts affect subsequent fraud risk assessments and evidence evaluation decisions. Unprimed auditors who receive more specific documentation increase their fraud risk assessments and evidence requests. Priming's effects are more complex. Priming auditors who receive summary documentation also increases fraud risk assessments and evidence requests; however, priming auditors who receive specific documentation reduces these judgments because the priming makes the client-specific risks seem less typical. Accordingly, the PCAOB's call for more documentation can have the unintended consequence of reducing auditors' sensitivity to fraud.

Auditors have difficulty evaluating the assumptions underlying management's estimates. One source of these problems is that auditors appear to dismiss evidence contradicting management's assumptions because their initial preference to support management's accounting biases their preliminary conclusions and, thus, their interpretation of evidence. We experimentally examine whether auditors with a balanced focus (i.e., a focus on documenting evidence that supports and contradicts their preliminary conclusion) are less likely to dismiss evidence that contradicts management's assumptions than auditors with a supporting focus (i.e., a focus on documenting evidence that supports their preliminary conclusion). We expect and find that, compared with auditors with a supporting focus, auditors with a balanced focus create documentation that is less dismissive of evidence contradicting management's estimate. Importantly, a balanced focus changes auditors' cognition and affects how auditors interpret contradicting evidence rather than merely increasing their documentation of this evidence. The effects of reduced dismissiveness persist to improve auditors' evaluations of a biased estimate and subsequent actions, improving audit quality in an important and difficult area.

Auditors experience significant problems auditing complex accounting estimates, and this increasingly puts financial reporting quality at risk. Based on analyses of the specific errors that auditors commit, we propose that auditors need to be able to think more broadly and incorporate information from a variety of sources in order to improve audit quality for these important accounts. We experimentally demonstrate that a deliberative mindset intervention improves auditors’ ability to identify unreasonable estimates by improving their ability to identify and incorporate into their analyses contradictory information from diverse parts of the audit and improving their ability to think critically about the evidence. We perform additional analyses to demonstrate that our intervention improves auditor performance by causing them to think differently rather than simply to work harder. We demonstrate that critical thinking can improve the identification of unreasonable estimates and, in doing so, we provide new directions for addressing audit quality issues.