We examine whether constraints on public firms affect firms' efficiency by testing if going private improves plant-level productivity relative to peer control groups. We find that, despite increases in productivity after going private, there is little evidence of efficiency gains relative to peer groups of plants constructed to control for industry, age, size, past productivity, and the endogeneity of the going-private decision. Going-private firms do extensively restructure their portfolio of plants, selling and closing plants more quickly than others. Our findings cast doubt on the view that public markets cause listed firms to operate plants less efficiently due to overinvestment but indicate that going private increases restructuring activity.

We propose a new measure of allocative efficiency based on unrealized increases in aggregate productivity growth. We show that the difference in the value of the marginal product of an input and its marginal cost at any plant—the plant-input gap—is exactly equal to the change in aggregate output that would occur if that plant changed that input's use by one unit. We show how to estimate this gap using plant-level data for 1982 to 1994 from Chilean manufacturing. We find the gaps for blue- and white-collar labor are quite large in absolute value, and these gaps (unlike for materials and electricity) are increasing over time. The timing of the sharpest increases in the labor gaps suggests that they may be related to increases in severance pay.

We examine whether constraints on public firms affect firms' efficiency by testing if going private improves plant-level productivity relative to peer control groups. We find that, despite increases in productivity after going private, there is little evidence of efficiency gains relative to peer groups of plants constructed to control for industry, age, size, past productivity, and the endogeneity of the going-private decision. Going-private firms do extensively restructure their portfolio of plants, selling and closing plants more quickly than others. Our findings cast doubt on the view that public markets cause listed firms to operate plants less efficiently due to overinvestment but indicate that going private increases restructuring activity.

We build a new concordance between the NBER Patent Data and U.S. Census microdata and use it to examine what happens when firms patent. We find strong evidence that increases in patent stock are associated with increases in firm size, scope, and skill and capital intensity. We find somewhat weaker evidence that changes in patenting are positively correlated with changes in total factor productivity. We also analyze first-time patentees and find similar effects following initial patent application. Together, these results suggest that patenting is indeed associated with real changes within firms, in particular with growth through increases in scope.

We propose an industry-level index of capital resalability—the share of used capital in aggregate industry capital expenditure—that relates (inversely) to sunkenness of investments. Using data from U.S. manufacturing, we then test the effect of capital resalability on industry productivity dispersion, mean productivity, and industry concentration. As predicted by standard models of industry equilibrium with heterogeneous firms, we find that increases in capital resalability are associated with a reduction in productivity dispersion, and an increase in the mean and median of the productivity distribution. Furthermore, we find that capital resalability is negatively correlated with industry concentration.

We collect worker month-level panel data from two companies in Beijing for a two-year period before and after the opening of a nearby subway station, which significantly improved public transportation commutes for some workers. We find a significant difference-in-differences increase (12.6% of the standard deviation) in bonus pay, which is strongly correlated to worker-level performance measures, for affected workers relative to unaffected coworkers. We find no evidence that the improved performance is a result of affected workers spending extra time at the workplace. We find suggestive evidence for a relative decline in turnover, consistent with a gain in utility for affected workers.