This paper analyzes a simple mobility-based model of mortgage lending and uses the results to illuminate the issue of mortgage points. The model predicts the points/interest-rate trade-off observed in the market, and it also predicts that mobile borrowers choose low-points/high-rate contracts from the available menu, in conformance with conventional wisdom. These outcomes are shown to be a result of adverse selection, which arises because of the lender′s inability to distinguish the mobility characteristics of borrowers. Empirical evidence is also presented showing the presence of a points/interest-rate trade-off in the market. In addition, relying on a proxy variable, the results establish that borrowers choose contracts from this menu according to mobility. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G21.

This paper analyzes the effect of borrower self-selection between fixed- and adjustable-rate mortgages (FRMs and ARMS) on the pricing of FRMs. Self-selection occurs according to borrower mobility, with the most mobile borrowers favoring ARMS and less mobile borrowers choosing FRMs. The FRM interest rate depends on the average mobility of the FRM borrower pool, which determines the average duration of FRM loans. Comparative-static analysis of the equilibrium shows that any exogenous change that increases the relative attractiveness of FRMs enlarges the FRM borrower pool, which lowers its average mobility, shortens the duration of FRM loans, and thus reduces their price. Thus, an increase in the demand for FRMs actually reduces the FRM interest rate.

This paper provides empirical evidence showing the effect of airline cooperation on the interline fares paid by international passengers. The analysis focuses on two measures of cooperation, codesharing and antitrust immunity, and the results show that their partial effects are both negative. The presence of codesharing on an international interline itinerary reduces the fare by 8%–17%, with the exact number depending on the sample used and the estimation method. Moreover, the presence of antitrust immunity reduces the fare by 13%–21%. Codesharing and immunity are substitutes, however, in the sense that their combined effect is smaller than the sum of their partial effects. Taking account of this difference, which is captured by an interaction variable in the regressions, the combined effect ranges between 17% and 30%. These results provide strong evidence that airline cooperation in the fare-setting process generates substantial benefits for interline passengers.

This paper analyzes airport congestion when carriers are nonatomistic, showing how the results of the road-pricing literature are modified when the economic agents causing congestion have market power. The analysis shows that when an airport is dominated by a monopolist, congestion is fully internalized, yielding no role for congestion pricing under monopoly conditions. Under a Cournot oligopoly, however, carriers are shown to internalize only the congestion they impose on themselves. A toll that captures the uninternalized portion of congestion may then improve the allocation of traffic. The analysis is supported by some rudimentary empirical evidence.

The aim of this article is to analyze the effects of housing discrimination on the wages and unemployment rates of black workers. The unemployment effect is first analyzed using a simple minimum‐wage model. An efficiency‐wage model is then adopted in order to endogenize both unemployment and wages. Under both models, suburban housing discrimination leads to a higher unemployment rate for blacks in the central city than in the suburbs. Under the efficiency‐wage model, black wages are also lower in the center. The analysis thus generates a link between unemployment and a seemingly unrelated phenomenon: racial discrimination in the housing market.

This paper estimates an empirical model of the choice between adjustable- and fixe d-rate mortgages using a large national database compiled by the Nat ional Association of Realtors. The explanatory variables in the probi t choice equation include borrower characteristics, regional dummies, the FRM rate, and the FRM-ARM rate differential. Since the intrerest rate on the mortgage not chosen is unobserved, this rate must be est imated in a way that eliminates selectivity bias. Simulation of the e stimated choice equation provides insight into the origin of the ARM revolution.

Many commentators believe that the phenomenon of urban sprawl, which is characterized by vigorous spatial expansion of urban areas, is a symptom of an economic system gone awry. By transforming pastoral farmland into often-unattractive suburbs, sprawl is thought to disrupt a natural balance between urban and non-urban land uses, leading to a deplorable degradation of the landscape.' This sentiment is often translated into policy through zoning restrictions designed to inhibit the conversion of land from agricultural to urban use (see Bryant and Conklin (1975)). The economist's view of urban expansion stands in stark contrast to this emotionally-charged indictment of sprawl. Economists believe that urban spatial size is determined by an orderly market process which correctly allocates land between urban and agricultural uses. The model underlying this view, which was originally developed by Muth (1969) and Mills (1972) and more completely analyzed by Wheaton (1974), suggests that urban spatial size is determined in a straightforward way by a number of exogenous variables. By showing empirically that urban size is related to the given variables (population, income, agricultural rent, and commuting cost) in the manner predicted by the model, the present paper achieves two goals. First, the empirical results suggest that the economist's view of urban sprawl is justified: rather than being determined by a process which indiscriminately consumes agricultural land, urban sizes are the result of an orderly market equilibrium where competing claims to the land are appropriately balanced.2 Second, by confirming the urban size predictions of the underlying model, the empirical results constitute yet another piece of evidence validating the basic framework of urban economic analysis.3 The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II sketches the structure of the Muth-Mills model and presents the main comparative static results relevant to urban sprawl. With the model's predictions in focus, section III discusses the sample and the data, and section IV presents the empirical results. Section V offers conclusions.

This paper identifies a new factor, the age of the housing stock, that affects where high- and low-income neighborhoods are located in U.S. cities. High-income households, driven by a high demand for housing services, tend to locate in areas of the city where the housing stock is relatively young. Because cities develop and redevelop from the center outward over time, the location of these neighborhoods varies over the city's history. The model predicts a suburban location for the rich in an initial period, when young dwellings are found only in the suburbs, while predicting eventual gentrification once central redevelopment creates a young downtown housing stock. Controlling for other determinants of where the poor live (e.g., proximity to amenities and public transit), empirical work indicates that if the influence of spatial variation in dwelling ages were eliminated, central-city/suburban disparities in neighborhood economic status would be reduced by up to 10 percentage points. Model estimates further predict that between 2000 and 2020, central-city/suburban differences in economic status will narrow in cities of all sizes, and especially in the larger metropolitan areas as American cities become more gentrified.

We explore an overlooked phenomenon in mortgage markets: repayment of underwater mortgages. Using a sample of mortgages terminated between 2007 and 2016, we show that such repayment indeed occurs, and that it is affected by the same factors commonly used in studies of default: the magnitude of home equity and the borrower’s credit score, which captures default cost as well as liquidity. A novel insight is that underwater repayers, unlike most defaulters, are not liquidity constrained, providing a much cleaner environment to study default costs. We estimate lower bounds on these costs. Our results indicate that default costs are substantial.