Focusing on mandatory partner rotations, we examine the importance of within‐firm network connections to the selection of successor partners and the impact of those connections on post‐rotation audit performance. Using data from China, we track partners' history and identify incumbent‐successor connections stemming from jointly conducted prior engagements. Although these connections can enhance incumbent‐successor information transfers and thus post‐rotation audit performance, they may also pose a threat to quality by compromising the successor's independence. Among the pool of replacement candidates, we find that individuals with stronger connections with the incumbent are more likely to be appointed as successors. This finding is more pronounced when the audit engagement is more complex, client‐specific knowledge is not readily available to the succeeding partner, and the engagement is more valuable to the audit firm. We also document that successor‐incumbent connections are associated with equal or better post‐rotation audit quality and fewer client defections. These results suggest that the benefits of network‐based successor selection may outweigh its costs. By enriching our understanding of the partner transition process, this study contributes to the public policy discourse on partner rotation.

We find that mutual funds whose managers are socially connected with firm auditors hold more shares of these firms and generate superior portfolio returns. Cross‐sectional results reveal that the relation between social connections and mutual fund stockholdings is more pronounced: when the social connections are stronger, when the auditor is in a better position or has stronger incentives to acquire private information, when the fund manager exercises more power, for small audit firms, for auditors in areas with poor investor protection, and for public firms with greater business opacity or private information. Other results are consistent with fund managers electing to schedule their corporate site visits to coincide with the fieldwork of their connected auditors, as would be expected if fund managers time their visits to meet with these auditors to facilitate information transfer. Additionally, we observe associations between fund trading prior to earnings surprises and audit opinions, and the presence of social connections between fund managers and firm auditors. Finally, we show that mutual funds and firms in which they invest tend to appoint connected auditors and pay them higher fees. Collectively, we document empirical patterns that would arise if socially connected auditors and mutual fund managers share information.

Although recent evidence suggests that individual audit partners explain a substantial portion of the variation in audit quality proxies, much less is known about what determines an audit partner's quality. Psychology and behavioral economics theories hold that an individual's experiences can have enduring impacts on subsequent behavior. We examine whether auditors' direct exposure to Arthur Andersen's collapse has a long‐term impact on the quality of their audits. Our evidence implies that audit partners who directly experienced Andersen's demise impose stricter monitoring evident in their clients exhibiting a lower propensity for misstatements and small profits, and paying higher audit fees. Importantly, these findings reconcile with research in finance and economics implying that firsthand experiences matter more to subsequent behavior than general economic conditions or secondhand or thirdhand experiences. Collectively, the results shed light on one facet of how partners' audit quality evolves over time. Our findings suggest that major failures associated with the audit firm in which an auditor works can ultimately result in these affected individuals later delivering higher audit quality, which should benefit audit committees in partner selection decisions and audit firms in designing partner assignment policies.

We examine the role and economic consequences of emotions in shaping the judgment of corporate executives. Analyzing a large sample of U.S. public firms, we find that sunshine-induced good mood leads managers to make upwardly biased earnings forecasts. Importantly, our evidence implies that managers become less susceptible to the sunshine priming effect in unambiguous settings, when their forecasts are subject to stricter external monitoring, and when they have stronger incentives to issue accurate forecasts. Additional tests show that equity market participants discern less informative signals from forecasts influenced by sunshine and that managers prone to the sunshine priming effect impose costs on their firms in the form of higher information risk and equity financing costs. Reflecting that labor markets also play a disciplinary role, we find that mood-prone managers suffer adverse career outcomes. We provide the first large-scale analysis on the nuanced ways in which emotions affect top executives.