[We analyze an intertemporal portfolio problem with both taxable and tax-deferred retirement accounts. Using a tax-arbitrage argument, we identify conditions under which the optimal location decision (where to place an asset) is separable from the allocation decision (how much to allocate to each asset). Investors place highly taxed assets in the tax-deferred account to maximize the tax benefit and adjust their taxable portfolios to achieve the optimal risk exposure. We show that the two-account problem can be reduced to a taxable-account-only problem. The results are robust to capital gains tax deferrals, consumption and contribution decisions, and stochastic tax rates.]

[In this paper, we develop an equilibrium model for stock market liquidity and its impact on asset prices when constant market presence is costly. We show that even when agents' trading needs are perfectly matched, costly market presence prevents them from synchronizing their trades and hence gives rise to endogenous order imbalances and the need for liquidity. Moreover, the endogenous liquidity need, when it occurs, is characterized by excessive selling of significant magnitudes. Such liquidity-driven selling leads to market crashes in the absence of any aggregate shocks. Finally, we show that illiquidity in the market leads to high expected returns, negative and asymmetric return serial correlation, and a positive relation between trading volume and future returns. We also propose new measures of liquidity based on its asymmetric impact on prices and demonstrate a negative relation between these measures and expected stock returns.]

[Mutual funds change their risk levels significantly over time. Risk shifting might be caused by ill-motivated trades of unskilled or agency-prone fund managers who trade to increase their personal compensation. Alternatively, risk shifting might occur when skilled fund managers trade to take advantage of their stock selection and timing abilities. This article investigates the performance consequences of risk shifting and sheds light on the mechanisms and the economic motivations behind risk-shifting behavior. Using a holdings-based measure of risk shifting, we find that funds that increase risk perform worse than funds that keep stable risk levels over time, suggesting that risk shifting either is an indication of inferior ability or is motivated by agency issues.]

We analyze an intertemporal portfolio problem with both taxable and tax-deferred retirement accounts. Using a tax-arbitrage argument, we identify conditions under which the optimal location decision (where to place an asset) is separable from the allocation decision (how much to allocate to each asset). Investors place highly taxed assets in the tax-deferred account to maximize the tax benefit and adjust their taxable portfolios to achieve the optimal risk exposure. We show that the two-account problem can be reduced to a taxable-account-only problem. The results are robust to capital gains tax deferrals, consumption and contribution decisions, and stochastic tax rates. The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected], Oxford University Press.

Complex mortgages became a popular borrowing instrument during the bullish housing market of the early 2000s but vanished rapidly during the subsequent downturn. These non-traditional loans, including interest-only and negative-amortization mortgages, enable households to postpone loan repayment in contrast to fully amortizing traditional mortgages. Contrary to common perception, complex mortgages are used by households with high-income levels and prime credit scores, quite unlike the low-income population targeted by subprime mortgages. Nonetheless, we find that complex-mortgage borrowers become delinquent on their mortgages at rates twice as high as borrowers with plain-vanilla fixed-rate contracts even after controlling for household and loan characteristics. Our findings suggest a link between innovations in mortgage markets focused on prime borrowers and the financial crisis.

This paper represents an equilibrium model for the demand and supply of liquidity and its impact on asset prices and welfare. We show that, when constant market presence is costly, purely idiosyncratic shocks lead to endogenous demand of liquidity and large price deviations from fundamentals. Moreover, market forces fail to lead to efficient supply of liquidity, which calls for potential policy interventions. However, we demonstrate that different policy tools can yield different efficiency consequences. For example, lowering the cost of supplying liquidity on the spot (e.g., through direct injection of liquidity or relaxation of ex post margin constraints) can decrease welfare while forcing more liquidity supply (e.g., through coordination of market participants) can improve welfare.

In this paper, we develop an equilibrium model for stock market liquidity and its impact on asset prices when constant market presence is costly. We show that even when agents' trading needs are perfectly matched, costly market presence prevents them from synchronizing their trades and hence gives rise to endogenous order imbalances and the need for liquidity. Moreover, the endogenous liquidity need, when it occurs, is characterized by excessive selling of significant magnitudes. Such liquidity-driven selling leads to market crashes in the absence of any aggregate shocks. Finally, we show that illiquidity in the market leads to high expected returns, negative and asymmetric return serial correlation, and a positive relation between trading volume and future returns. We also propose new measures of liquidity based on its asymmetric impact on prices and demonstrate a negative relation between these measures and expected stock returns.

We empirically investigate the impact of government debt on corporate financing decisions in an international setting. We show a negative relation between government debt and corporate leverage using data on 40 countries between 1990–2014. This negative relation is stronger for government debt that is financed domestically, for firms that are larger and more profitable, and in countries with more developed equity markets. To address potential endogeneity concerns, we use an instrumental variable approach based on military spending and a quasi-natural experiment based on the introduction of the Euro currency. Our findings suggest that government debt crowds out corporate debt.

Mutual funds change their risk levels significantly over time. Risk shifting might be caused by ill-motivated trades of unskilled or agency-prone fund managers who trade to increase their personal compensation. Alternatively, risk shifting might occur when skilled fund managers trade to take advantage of their stock selection and timing abilities. This article investigates the performance consequences of risk shifting and sheds light on the mechanisms and the economic motivations behind risk-shifting behavior. Using a holdings-based measure of risk shifting, we find that funds that increase risk perform worse than funds that keep stable risk levels over time, suggesting that risk shifting either is an indication of inferior ability or is motivated by agency issues.