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Disclosure Incentives and Effects on Cost of Capital around the World

The Accounting Review 2005 80(4), 1125-1162
Prior research predicts that firms reliant on external financing are more likely to undertake a higher level of disclosure, and a higher disclosure level should, in turn, lead to a lower cost of external financing. This paper tests these predictions outside the United States where alternative legal and financial systems could mitigate the effectiveness of such disclosures and, comprehensively, examines both disclosure incentives and disclosure consequences on cost of capital for a common set of firms. Using a sample from 34 countries, we find that firms in industries with greater external financing needs have higher voluntary disclosure levels, and that an expanded disclosure policy for these firms leads to a lower cost of both debt and equity capital. Crosscountry differences in legal and financial systems affect observed disclosure levels in predicted ways. However, a surprising result in the study is that voluntary disclosure incentives appear to operate independently of country-level factors, which suggests the effectiveness of voluntary disclosure in gaining access to lower cost external financing around the world.

The Pricing of National and City-Specific Reputations for Industry Expertise in the U.S. Audit Market

The Accounting Review 2005 80(1), 113-136
The pricing of Big 5 industry leadership in the U.S. audit market is investigated using audit fee disclosures for the 2000–2001 fiscal years and the joint nationalcity framework in Ferguson et al. (2003). There is a significant fee premium of 19 percent on those engagements where Big 5 auditors are both the nationally top-ranked auditor and the city-level industry leader in the city where the client is headquartered, indicating that national and city-specific industry leadership jointly affect auditor reputation and pricing. However, there is never a premium in any tests for auditors that are national industry leaders alone without also being city-specific industry leaders, indicating that national leadership by itself does not result in a premium. The evidence is mixed with respect to city-specific industry leaders alone that are not also national industry leaders. While there is a premium of 8 percent in the primary tests, this result is inconclusive as it does not hold in all sensitivity analyses.