We study the effects of Confucian social norms on savings rates in China. In our simple two-period model, parents have the option to invest in either a risk-free asset or their children’s human capital. We assume that the filial piety norms and thus the enforcement mechanisms for supporting old-age parents differ across regions. Consequently, the probability of children’s non-performance of their repayment obligations to parents and the returns parents can expect from investing in their children vary. We test the model predictions using data from the China Household Finance Survey. We find that stronger Confucian social norms reduce the gap in the savings rate between families with sons and with daughters. Modeling default by children as a function of the prevailing social norms gives us the flexibility to study the impacts of declining Confucian influence on consumption–savings trends in China.

We examine how firms' dividend policy affects the initial compensation of their newly appointed CEOs. We focus on newly appointed CEOs to isolate the effect of dividends on compensation and to provide new insights into an aspect largely neglected by compensation research. We show that the dividend payout is positively related to new CEO compensation. Further, the positive effect of dividends is stronger for firms with no dividend cuts over the past two, three and four years, firms with relatively high institutional ownership, and those with strong boards, consistent with new CEOs receiving higher pay as compensation for greater dividend pressure.

Using the staggered enactment of constituency statutes across US states, we find that banks with directors whose legal duties are expanded to consider stakeholder and long-term interests significantly reduce risk-taking by increasing capital and shifting to safer borrowers. Additionally, we find that the effect of statute enactment on bank performance is insignificant on average but significantly positive for banks that take excessive risk. Furthermore, we find that banks that previously received a statute enactment fared significantly better during the crises. Our findings support the increasing calls for greater emphasis on stakeholder interests amidst the current bank regulatory and governance reforms.

This paper provides new evidence that correlated abnormal compensation of CEOs and directors is symptomatic of agency problems associated with cronyism. We find that director abnormal compensation has a negative impact on the likelihood of CEO turnover and reduces the sensitivity of CEO turnover to poor stock performance. However, for firms with greater institutional ownership the adverse effects of director abnormal compensation are mitigated, and the negative impact of abnormal compensation on firm performance is reduced. These findings suggest that correlated abnormal compensation of CEOs and directors is likely associated with agency problems.