I study how supplier contracting frictions shape the patterns of intermediate input use and quantify the impact of these distortions on aggregate productivity. Using the frequency of litigation between US firms as a novel measure to capture the need for formal enforcement, I find a robust relationship between countries' input-output structure and their quality of legal institutions. In countries with high enforcement costs, firms have lower expenditure shares on intermediate inputs in sector pairs where US firms litigate frequently for breach of contract. A quantitative model shows that improvement of contract enforcement institutions would lead to sizable welfare gains.

This paper considers how far private adaptation may reduce future vulnerability to climate risks. Using data on monthly firm-to-firm transactions from Pakistan, we find that flood-affected firms are more likely to relocate to safer ground and shift purchases toward suppliers in less flood-prone regions and reached via less flood-prone roads. The results indicate that firms are imperfectly informed about flood risk and update their beliefs following floods. We quantify aggregate impacts using a spatial model of endogenous production network formation. The findings suggest that firms' learning will shape the economic impact of increasingly frequent climate-related disasters.

We present five facts from an experiment on the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of transitory transfers: (1) the one-month MPC on a cash-like transfer is 23 percent; (2) it is substantially higher (61 percent) on a transfer administered via a card where remaining funds expire after three weeks, inconsistent with money fungibility; (3) the consumption response is concentrated in the first three weeks; (4) MPCs vary with household characteristics but are high even for the liquid wealthy; (5) unconditional MPC distribution exhibits large variation. Our findings inform the design of stimulus policies and pose challenges to existing macroeconomic models.

Resource-based theories propose that firms grow by diversifying into products that use common capabilities. We provide evidence for common-input capabilities, using a policy that removed entry barriers in input markets to show that the similarity of a firm’s and an industry’s input mix determines firm production choices. We model industry choice and economies of scope from input capabilities. When the model is estimated for Indian manufacturing, input complementarities make firms 5% more likely to produce in an industry and are quantitatively as important as time-invariant drivers of coproduction rates. Upstream entry barriers were equivalent to a 9.5% tariff on inputs.

The strength of contract enforcement determines how firms source inputs and organize production. Using microdata on Indian manufacturing plants, we show that production and sourcing decisions appear systematically distorted in states with weaker enforcement. Specifically, we document that in industries that tend to rely more heavily on relationship-specific intermediate inputs, plants in states with more-congested courts shift their expenditures away from intermediate inputs and have a greater vertical span of production. To quantify the effect of these distortions on aggregate productivity, we construct a model in which plants have several ways of producing, each with different bundles of inputs. Weak enforcement exacerbates a holdup problem that arises when using inputs that require customization, distorting both the intensive and extensive margins of input use. The equilibrium organization of production and the network structure of input-output linkages arise endogenously from the producers’ simultaneous cost-minimization decisions. We identify the structural parameters that govern enforcement frictions from cross-state variation in the first moments of producers’ cost shares. A set of counterfactuals show that enforcement frictions lower aggregate productivity to an extent that is relevant on the macro scale.