This paper shows that collateralized short-term debt, although privately optimal for reducing borrowers’ risk-taking incentives, can induce fragility (multiple equilibria). Despite sequential-service property being absent in collateralized debt, such as repurchase agreements, a systemic run can arise, featuring large increases in default risks, fire-sale discounts of collateral, cost of credit, and amount of credit rationing. Asset price guarantees, leverage caps, and central clearing promote stability and welfare. Using global games techniques, I show that a systemic run is more likely in bad times, and a large enough asset price guarantee reduces run risks.

We consider a market where large investors do not only trade on information about asset fundamentals. When they trade more aggressively, the price becomes less informative. Other investors who learn from prices, in turn, are less concerned about adverse selection and provide more liquidity, causing large investors to trade even more aggressively. This trading complementarity can engender three unconventional results: i) increased competition among large investors makes all investors worse off, ii) more precise private information reduces price informativeness, creating complementarities in information acquisition, and iii) multiple equilibria emerge. Our results have implications for competition and transparency policies in financial markets.

Does securitization distort the foreclosure decisions of non-performing mortgages? In a model of mortgage-backed securitization with an endogenous foreclosure policy, we find that the securitizing bank adopts a tougher foreclosure policy than the first-best, despite resulting in higher loan losses. This is optimal because foreclosure mitigates the adverse selection problem in securitization by making the optimal security, a risky debt, less information-sensitive. We further show that policies that limit mortgage foreclosure would discourage the bank’s ex ante screening effort, reducing the quality of securitized mortgages. Our model yields novel testable predictions on the effect of mortgage securitization on foreclosure rates, loan performance, and mortgage servicing.

This article analyzes the optimal allocation of losses via a Central Clearing Counterparty (CCP) in the presence of counterparty risk. A CCP can hedge this risk by mutualizing losses among its members. This protection, however, weakens members’ incentives to manage counterparty risk. Delegating members’ risk monitoring to the CCP alleviates this tension in large markets. To discipline the CCP at minimum cost, members offer the CCP a junior tranche and demand capital contribution. Our results endogenize key layers of the default waterfall and deliver novel predictions on its composition, collateral requirements, and CCP ownership structure.

We analyze a tractable rational expectations equilibrium model with margin constraints. We argue that constraints affect and are affected by informational efficiency, leading to a novel amplification mechanism. A decline in wealth tightens constraints and reduces investors’ incentive to acquire information, lowering price informativeness. Lower informativeness, in turn, increases the risk borne by financiers who fund trades, leading them to further tighten constraints faced by investors. This information spiral leads to (a) significant increases in risk premium and return volatility in crises, when investors wealth declines, (b) complementarities in information acquisition in crises, and (c) complementarities in margin requirements.

We document aggregate outflows from corporate bond mutual funds days before and after the announcement of increases in the Federal Funds Target rate (FFTar). To rationalize this phenomenon, we build a model in which funds’ net-asset-values (NAVs) are stale and investors strategically redeem to profit from the mispricing when they learn about the increases of FFTar. Consistent with the model’s predictions, we find that stale NAVs and loose monetary policy environments weaken (strengthen) outflows sensitivity to increases in FFTar during illiquid (liquid) market conditions. Our results highlight when and how monetary policy could systematically exacerbate the fragility of corporate bond funds.