This article analyzes the optimal allocation of losses via a Central Clearing Counterparty (CCP) in the presence of counterparty risk. A CCP can hedge this risk by mutualizing losses among its members. This protection, however, weakens members’ incentives to manage counterparty risk. Delegating members’ risk monitoring to the CCP alleviates this tension in large markets. To discipline the CCP at minimum cost, members offer the CCP a junior tranche and demand capital contribution. Our results endogenize key layers of the default waterfall and deliver novel predictions on its composition, collateral requirements, and CCP ownership structure.

We document aggregate outflows from corporate bond mutual funds days before and after the announcement of increases in the Federal Funds Target rate (FFTar). To rationalize this phenomenon, we build a model in which funds’ net-asset-values (NAVs) are stale and investors strategically redeem to profit from the mispricing when they learn about the increases of FFTar. Consistent with the model’s predictions, we find that stale NAVs and loose monetary policy environments weaken (strengthen) outflows sensitivity to increases in FFTar during illiquid (liquid) market conditions. Our results highlight when and how monetary policy could systematically exacerbate the fragility of corporate bond funds.