A unique dataset of post-IPO thrifts with heterogeneous initial insider ownership allows us to use revealed preferences to determine the level of ownership insiders believe to be optimal. We find strong evidence that insider ownership converges to the 20% to 30% range, whether insiders begin with diffuse or concentrated ownership. This range of ownership has been found consistent with entrenchment and control in the literature. Our results are robust to a battery of variables related to insider ownership such as moral hazard, adverse selection, market timing, insider characteristics, and firm characteristics. Furthermore, we find that managers with diffuse ownership accumulate shares most aggressively during the period of regulatory anti-takeover protection, consistent with an entrenchment motive. We find that managers with above-average pay are more likely to seek higher ownership, consistent with the existence of private benefits of control. Finally, we find that insider ownership determines equity issuance, leverage, and share liquidity in ways consistent with expected accumulation or reduction in insider ownership for control purposes.

We examine the relationship between U.S. thrift institution ownership structure and risk taking along with the impact of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) on this relationship. Our results, based on various indicators of risk, suggest that insider controlled thrifts were more likely to engage in risk taking prior to 1989 than were diversely held institutions. FIRREA seems to have curtailed much of this risk taking. We find inverse relationships between risk-taking and levels of institutional shareholdings. This along with other evidence suggests that the motive for risk-taking was not maximization of the ‘option’ value of shares as has been reported elsewhere. We also find evidence that entrenched managers may have generated significant private benefits.

Sweden has a high degree of separation of ownership from control through pyramids, dual-class shares, and cross-holdings. This increases the potential for private benefits of control. However, Sweden's extralegal institutions—tax compliance and newspaper circulation—are consistent with greater shareholder protection. Using data on Swedish mergers we find limited evidence of shareholder expropriation. Apparently, Sweden's extralegal institutions offset the drawback of weak corporate governance.

Using information collected from the Swedish tax authorities, we calculate insiders’ actual effective tax rates on dividends. With this unique dataset, we find a significant negative cross-sectional relationship between insiders’ effective tax rates and dividend payout. This result is consistent with a tax-induced clientele effect for dividends. We also look at the impact of large block trades on dividends. We find that when insiders with zero effective taxes sell blocks, subsequent dividend payments are significantly more likely to decrease. This provides evidence that large shareholders are adjusting dividends for their individual tax situations.

The CLO shapes and enforces corporate governance, but is faced with a dual-role paradox that requires her to act as both monitor of corporate governance and executive of the firm. We study the role of the CLO under environments that are most likely to impact governance and pressure the firm to either emphasize or marginalize the CLO's role as monitor or facilitator. Using the financial shock of a securities class action lawsuit on large corporations, we measure changes in CLO value through the metrics of total and relative compensation of the CLO and other C-suite members. After controlling for relevant variables such as growth and total assets, we find that when firms have more insiders on their board of directors, the CLO's compensation declines when the preceding year's Tobin's Q is high. CLO compensation increases under conditions of high opacity, but that compensation partially erodes in high Tobin's Q environments. We also find that a lawsuit increases CFO and CEO turnover but not the CLO's. Our results have implications for corporate governance, the dual and potentially conflicting role of CLO as gatekeeper and monitor, executive compensation, and agency costs.

We use estimates of the Black—Scholes sensitivity of managers' stock option portfolios to stock return volatility and the sensitivity of managers' stock and stock option portfolios to stock price to test the relationship between managers' risk preferences and hedging activities. We find that as the sensitivity of managers' stock and stock option portfolios to stock price increases, firms tend to hedge more. However, as the sensitivity of managers' stock option portfolios to stock return volatility increases, firms tend to hedge less.

IPO underpricing has been attributed to valuation uncertainty, which can be at least partially resolved by the indirect learning associated with IPO clustering [Benveniste, L.M., Ljungqvist, A., Wilhelm, W.J., Yu, X.Y., 2003. Evidence of information spillovers in the production of investment banking services. Journal of Finance 58, 577–608]. We examine why firms might choose not to issue their IPOs contemporaneously with clusters of similar firms, forgoing opportunities to learn from their peers. We find that the willingness to file an IPO without the benefit of indirect learning from peer firm IPOs is directly related to insiders’ needs for portfolio diversification and the firm’s need to raise capital.