Roughly two decades ago, standard setters mandated recognition of two controversial expenses: stock-based compensation (SBC) and amortization of intangibles from acquisitions (AMT). Today, most firms “undo” GAAP by excluding these recurring expenses from earnings as part of their non-GAAP reporting. Do investors agree? Using short-window returns around quarterly earnings announcements, we find investors react similarly to unexpected SBC/AMT, regardless of firms' exclusion reporting. Further, among excluders, earnings that include SBC or AMT explain investor reaction better than earnings stripped of these items. Thus, these excluded expenses are an important exception to the well-known regularity that investors find non-GAAP earnings more useful than GAAP earnings. Additional tests reveal that exclusion is not informative about future persistence. Overall, our findings suggest that, in general, investors ignore firms’ exclusion of recurring expenses, which may offer reassurance to standard setters.

Short interest is currently required to be disclosed twice per month, but regulators have sought to increase this frequency. Meanwhile, short interest information from private third‐party vendors has emerged to meet investor demand on a daily basis. We find that daily private‐sector data strongly predict bimonthly regulatory disclosure. Furthermore, private‐sector data help price discovery, albeit with modest economic magnitude. Investors tend to underreact to the information content of private‐sector data mainly due to limits to arbitrage rather than market inattention. Despite the costly access to private‐sector data, we find no evidence that retail investors are harmed in their trades. Overall, our findings highlight the interplay between private‐sector and regulatory solutions in enhancing financial market transparency.

We examine the effect of fair value standards on firms' litigation risk. The discretion required by fair value allows plaintiffs to “second guess” managers' judgments, potentially increasing litigation risk. Alternatively, the complexity of fair value may decrease litigation risk if it's more difficult to demonstrate scienter. Our evidence suggests firms that rely more on fair value standards are relatively less likely to be sued. We find no evidence of a relation between fair value and the risk of misstatements or fraud, but do find evidence of a slight increase in firms' litigation risk via an increase in volatility. However, the primary effect of fair value standards in reducing litigation risk dominates the volatility effect. Finally, we find average litigation rates increase after the passage of new standards, but less so for fair value standards. On balance, our evidence suggests fair value is a relatively low litigation risk area in GAAP.