Using a panel of 496 banks from the G20 nations, the study assesses the role of macroprudential policies in reducing systemic risk. The study further assesses the utility of these policies in conjunction with monetary policy instruments and bank and country-specific characteristics and finds the significant impact of macroprudential policies in curbing systemic risk and promoting economic stability. The study finds this relationship to hold regardless of economic conditions like inflationary pressure and financial distress. The result highlights that easing macroprudential policies during financial distress can help banks cope with systemic losses. We split the macroprudential policies into policies targeting the demand and supply of loans and find complementarity among the policies to reduce systemic risk. Our results demonstrate the heterogenous effect of macroprudential policies in limiting systemic risk, with the effect varying with bank size, leverage, liquidity, and concentration of loans. Finally, we find a moderating role of these policies in limiting the impact of uncertainties on systemic risk.

Using a novel dataset that combines information on customer-supplier trade relationships with information on firm-bank lending relationships, we show that common banks that lend to firms at both ends of a trade link grow and strengthen such trade relationships. To establish causality, we use bank mergers, which generate exogenous variations in the presence of common banks, and show that common bank relationships between customers and suppliers increase trade relationships by 49.6%. We find that the role of a common bank is greater when it is more informed and when supply chains suffer from larger information and holdup problems. We also document that suppliers with common banks face lower spillover risks from a distressed customer. Overall, our findings show the unique role of banks in driving inter-firm growth and investment by mitigating information and holdup problems, which arguably leads to greater economic growth.

We use novel survey data to study firms’ inventory contracts. We document facts about the usage of purchase and sale contracts. We find that firms purchase and sell inventory through three contractual arrangements: fixed price and quantity, fixed price only, and fixed quantity only. Those using fixed price and quantity hold the largest share of contracts. The average duration of purchase contracts is not very different from the average duration of sale contracts. We then find that the upward bias in inflation expectations is a feature of firms that do not purchase or sell largely through contracts. Our findings are useful in the calibration of sticky price models.

Using hand-collected data on the cultural origins of S&P 500 CEOs and their spouses, we examine whether differences in risk attitudes within marriages influence corporate risk-taking behavior. We find that CEOs with more risk averse spouses adopt relatively safer corporate policies. The effect is stronger if the CEO comes from a more collectivist culture , has been married more recently, or shares more responsibilities with their spouse. Together, these findings suggest that the cultural composition of CEOs’ households and their spouses’ risk preference affect corporate risk-taking behavior.

We develop a dynamic model of corporate investment and financing, in which shocks to the value of collateralizable assets generate variation in firms’ debt capacity. We show that the degree of similarity among firms’ financial flexibility forecasts cross-sectional variation in return correlation. We test the implications of the model with firm-level data in two empirical analyses using i) an instrumental variable approach based on shocks to the value of collateralizable corporate assets and ii) the outbreak of the COVID-19 crisis as an event study. We find that firms in the same percentile of the cross-sectional distribution of financial flexibility have 62% higher correlation in stock-return residuals than firms 50 percentiles apart.

The share of secured debt issued (as a fraction of total corporate debt) declined steadily in the United States over the twentieth century. This stems partly from financial development giving creditors greater confidence that high‐quality borrowers will respect their claims even if creditors do not obtain security upfront. Consequently, such borrowers prefer retaining financial flexibility by not giving security up front. Instead, security is given contingently—when a firm approaches distress. This also explains why, superimposed on the secular decline, the share of secured debt issued is countercyclical.

We arranged for trained undercover men and women to pose as potential clients and visit all 65 local financial advisory firms in Hong Kong. At financial planning firms, but not at securities firms, women were more likely than men to receive advice to buy only individual or only local securities. Female clients who signaled high confidence, high risk tolerance, or a domestic outlook were especially likely to receive this suboptimal advice. Our theoretical model explains these patterns as a result of statistical discrimination interacting with advisors’ incentives. Taste‐based discrimination is unlikely to explain the results.