Survey evidence suggests most firms use the CAPM to estimate their cost of equity. Previous research has documented these estimates can be extremely imprecise. We study the impact of the precision of beta estimates on firm investment decisions, and find that firms with precise beta estimates invest closer to their expected levels. We employ quantile regressions to further examine the relationship between Beta Precision and investment levels and find that firms with more precise betas tend to avoid extremes in investment levels. Finally, we show that precision in the estimation of cost of equity is associated with higher risk-adjusted stock returns.

Numerous scholars have investigated the link between option-based compensation and innovation in public firms, generally concluding options motivate innovative activities better than alternative compensation methods. In most studies, the evidence of causality is weak or suffers from econometric concerns, leading to questions regarding the conclusions. We use the implementation of FAS 123R as a quasi-natural experiment to explore the role option compensation has in incentivizing innovation. FAS 123R increased the cost of granting options as compensation, resulting in a plausibly exogenous shift away from options. Using an updated sample of patent applications, we do not observe any decline in innovation. Despite a similar empirical design, our results differ from those of Mao and Zhang (2018), due to truncation bias inherent in their patent data. Overall, using our updated data, our findings are inconsistent with conclusions from prior studies and suggest option-based compensation does not drive innovation.

Firms routinely reduce their employee headcount in response to competitive and economic pressures. The effectiveness of downsizing appears mixed as firms enjoy positive excess returns but also increased delisting and default likelihoods, consistent with compensating investors for additional risk. Insiders at downsizing firms are more likely to purchase shares than those at other firms, and in this study, we explore insider trading activity as a signal about the effectiveness of corporate downsizing. Exploiting heterogeneity within downsizing firms, we find that the excess returns observed in downsizing firms are concentrated in firms where insiders purchase shares. Further, insider purchases are followed by lower future delisting likelihoods and financial distress in downsizing firms. Finally, we observe that insider purchases at downsizing firms are more prominent when trades are easily observable. Our results are consistent with insiders intentionally providing costly, credible signals about corporate executives' plan for firm improvement following downsizing.

We revisit the information content of stock trading by corporate insiders with an expectation that opportunistic insiders will spread their trades over longer periods of time when they have a longer-lived informational advantage, and trade in a short window of time when their advantage is fleeting. Controlling for the duration of insiders' trading strategies, we find robust new evidence that both insiders' sales and purchases predict abnormal stock returns. In addition, we provide evidence that insiders attempt to preserve their informational advantages and increase their trading profits by disclosing their trades after the market has closed. When insiders report their trades after business hours, they are more likely to engage in longer series of trades, they trade more shares overall, and their trades are associated with larger abnormal returns. Finally, we show how accounting for these trading patterns sharpens screens for corporate insiders who trade on infor- mation.

We show that firms with Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) who personally benefit from options backdating are more likely to engage in other corporate misbehaviors, suggestive of an unethical corporate culture. These firms are more likely to commit financial fraud to overstate earnings. They acquire more private companies, which could perpetuate their frauds, and their acquisitions are met with lower market responses. These misbehaviors are concentrated in firms with externally hired suspect CEOs, consistent with outside CEOs having greater discretion to shape firm culture. The costs of these misbehaviors are reflected in larger stock price declines during a market correction and increased CEO replacement.

We test the association between CFO effort and the quality of public firms' financial information environments. We evaluate this relation using a measure of CFO leisure consumption—specifically, the amount of golf played—as an inverse proxy for effort. We find a negative relation between CFOs' compensation incentives and golf play, suggesting they exert more effort when they have greater incentives to increase firm value. High CFO leisure consumption is associated with lower earnings quality, less accurate earnings guidance, and reduced CFO conference call participation. Additionally, CFO leisure appears to affect external monitors, as it is associated with greater analyst forecast dispersion and increased audit fees. We do not find similar relations when evaluating the amount of golf played by CEOs, suggesting the unique importance of CFO effort in the financial reporting process.