We find that local religious social norms mitigate professional misconduct by financial advisors. Using publicly disclosed misconduct data, we find that financial advisors working in areas with greater religious participation are less likely to violate ethical standards. When advisors move to counties with greater religious participation, their misconduct rates decrease. The effect of local religiosity is robust across population density levels, misconduct types, and market conditions. We strengthen identification by using shocks to religious participation following local disclosures of sexual abuse by Catholic priests. The findings show that local religiosity restrains misconduct not only in previously studied corporate financial settings but also when professionals provide financial services to individuals and households.

We test the signaling view of corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagement using two complementary quasi-natural experiments that impose exogenous negative pressure on stock prices. Firms under such adverse price pressure increase CSR activities compared to otherwise similar firms. This effect concentrates among firms with stronger signaling incentives, namely, those facing greater information asymmetry, more product market competition, higher shareholder litigation risk, and higher stock price crash risk. Firms under the exogenous negative price pressure mainly improve CSR strengths, including costly environmental investments. We also find that CSR engagement attracts socially responsible investors and lowers the cost of capital for signaling firms.

We explore the impact of overlapping institutional ownership (OIO) within supply chains on the earnings management practices of supplier firms. Utilizing a dataset of U.S. publicly traded supplier firms from 1988 to 2016, we discover that suppliers with institutional ownership overlapping with their major customers exhibit reduced levels of discretionary accruals. This finding implies that such overlap discourages suppliers from engaging in upward earnings management through the manipulation of discretionary accruals. We also find that OIO curtails accrual-based earnings management by enhancing the relationship between supply chain partners and bolstering external monitoring. Additionally, we find that OIO also mitigates the extent of real earnings management undertaken by the supplier firm. These findings remain robust after addressing potential endogeneity concerns. Our results underscore the significant role of OIO within supply chains in curbing both accrual-based and real earnings management by supplier firms.

This study investigates whether the management earnings forecasts of Republican and Democratic CEOs differ due to systematic differences in their information disclosure preferences. We find that Republican CEOs prefer a less asymmetric information environment than Democrat CEOs, and thus make more frequent, timelier, and more accurate disclosures than Democrat CEOs. Results using the propensity score matched sample and difference-in-differences analysis show that our results are unlikely to be driven by potential endogeneity. Our results are robust to controlling for various CEO characteristics and are stronger for firms with higher levels of institutional ownership and litigation risk.