This study examines whether corporate share repurchases are responsible for the decline in labor share among U.S. firms since the 1980s. Using census data and various empirical approaches, we find no evidence suggesting that increases in share repurchases contribute to reductions in labor share. We find no correlation between share repurchases and labor share declines, and the firms most engaged in repurchases do not decrease labor share. Using exogenous variation linked to EPS announcements and taxation policies, we further validate these findings, indicating that policies aimed at improving labor share by discouraging share buybacks are unlikely to meet their objectives.

We study the influence of multi-sector conglomerate firms on sectoral comovement. Using an innovative network model of firms and industries, we derive a novel measure of the co-concentration of industries in which two industries are more co-concentrated if they share greater exposure to the same conglomerate firms. Using time-series, cross-sectional, and longitudinal tests on establishment-level data from nearly all US firms over 1991 to 2019, we find that industries with higher co-concentration exhibit stronger comovement in employment, sales, and asset growth. Controlling for alternative explanations, a one-standard deviation increase in co-concentration corresponds to a 0.32-standard deviation increase in the comovement of employment growth. In variance-covariance decompositions, we find that firm-specific shocks explain nearly half of aggregate volatility and industry comovement and that conglomerates play a significant role in sectoral comovement. Our framework helps explain how idiosyncratic, firm-level shocks contribute to aggregate fluctuations and influence business cycles.

Exploiting demand shocks from changes in federal government spending, we examine how the organizational structure of a firm affects its investment behavior. Government spending shocks affect the investment of government-dependent conglomerate segments less than matched stand-alone firms. Investment also increases in lower government-dependent segments when other segments within the same firm experience positive demand shocks, indicating cross-subsidization between segments. We further show that this cross-subsidization leads to worse operating performance and increases the diversification discount. Our findings are robust after addressing the endogeneity of government spending.

This paper examines the effects of shareholder investment horizons on insider trading. We find that insiders are less likely to trade on private information and the profitability of insider trades is lower when shareholder investment horizons are longer. We further examine two channels through which shareholders with longer investment horizons can impede insider trading: direct monitoring and better information environment. Consistent with the direct monitoring channel, we show that insiders in firms with longer shareholder investment horizons are more likely to shift trades from the month right before earnings announcements to the month right after earnings announcements. Moreover, the impact of investment horizons are stronger in firms with higher ex ante litigation risk, with lower corporate governance quality, and that are not targets of hedge fund activists. Consistent with the information environment channel, we show that longer shareholder investment horizons increase the frequencies of information disclosure and insiders in firms with longer shareholder investment horizons are more likely to trade in an isolated manner rather than in sequences.

Using panel data on top management characteristics and a management quality factor constructed using common factor analysis on individual management quality measures, we analyze the relation between top firm management quality and corporate innovation input and output. We show that top management quality is an important determinant of corporate innovation, with individual aspects of management quality affecting innovation in younger and older firms differently. Further, firms with higher top management quality engage in more risky (“explorative”) innovation strategies. Finally, hiring more and higher-quality inventors is an important channel through which firms with higher management quality achieve greater innovation output.