In this paper, I examine a new approach for measuring earnings quality, defined as the closeness of reported earnings to “permanent earnings,” based on firm decisions with regard to capital and labor investments. Specifically, I measure earnings quality as the contemporaneous association between changes in the levels of capital and labor investment and the change in reported earnings. This approach follows the reasoning that (1) firms make investment decisions based on the net present value (NPV) of investment projects and (2) reported earnings with higher quality should more closely associate with real investment decisions. I find that measures of earnings quality based on managerial labor and capital decisions correlate positively with earnings persistence and have incremental explanatory power relative to earnings-quality measures used in the accounting literature. Furthermore, investment-based earnings-quality measures are less informative when managers tend to overinvest.

[Through the interaction between financial constraints and R&D, I study two asset-pricing puzzles: mixed evidence on the financial constraints—return relation and the positive R&D-return relation. Unlike capital investment, R&D is more inflexible. A financially constrained R&D-intensive firm is more likely to suspend/discontinue R&D projects. Therefore, R&D-intensive firms' risk increases with their financial constraints. Conversely, constrained firms' risk increases with their R&D intensity. I find a robust empirical relation between financial constraints and stock returns, primarily among R&D-intensive firms. Moreover, R&D predicts returns only among financially constrained firms. This evidence suggests that financial constraints potentially drive the positive R&D-return relation.]

This paper does three things. First, it explores the type of asymmetry in exchange rate correlation for five inflation-targeting countries. We show their currencies co-move more closely with the currencies of some influential foreign countries during joint appreciations than joint depreciations against a world currency. Second, it establishes empirically the linkage between interest rate differentials and exchange rate correlation. We find evidence that both widening and narrowing interest rate differentials will reduce the correlation. Third, it proposes a new version of the asymmetric dynamic conditional correlation model. The model proves to be capable of providing great insight into the two issues investigated.

[We show that new managers who take over mutual fund portfolios sell off inherited momentum losers at higher rates than stocks in any other momentum decile, even after adjusting for concurrent trades in these stocks by continuing fund managers. This behavior is observed regardless of fund characteristics and is stronger when new managers are external hires. The tendency of continuing fund managers to hold on to losers could be consistent with either a behavior bias stemming from an inability to ignore the sunk costs associated with the stocks' past underperformance or a conscious desire to protect their careers by not admitting prior mistakes. Furthermore, we present evidence that selling off loser stocks helps improve fund performance.]

This paper employs heterogeneity in institutional shareholder tax characteristics to identify the relation between firm payout policy and tax incentives. Analysis of a panel of firms matched with the tax characteristics of the clients of their institutional shareholders indicates that “dividend-averse” institutions are significantly less likely to hold shares in firms with larger dividend payouts. This relation between the tax preferences of institutional shareholders and firm payout policy may reflect dividend-averse institutions gravitating towards low dividend paying firms or managers adapting their payout policies to the interests of their institutional shareholders. Evidence is provided that both effects are operative. Plausibly exogenous changes in payout policy result in shifting institutional ownership patterns. Similarly, exogenous changes in the tax cost of institutional investors receiving dividends results in changes in firm dividend policy.

Through the interaction between financial constraints and R&D, I study two asset-pricing puzzles: mixed evidence on the financial constraints--return relation and the positive R&D-return relation. Unlike capital investment, R&D is more inflexible. A financially constrained R&D-intensive firm is more likely to suspend/discontinue R&D projects. Therefore, R&D-intensive firms' risk increases with their financial constraints. Conversely, constrained firms' risk increases with their R&D intensity. I find a robust empirical relation between financial constraints and stock returns, primarily among R&D-intensive firms. Moreover, R&D predicts returns only among financially constrained firms. This evidence suggests that financial constraints potentially drive the positive R&D-return relation. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

This paper investigates the risk-return trade-off by taking into account the model specification problem. Market volatility is modeled to have two components, one due to the diffusion risk and the other due to the jump risk. The model implies Merton’s ICAPM in the absence of leverage effects, whereas the return–volatility relations are determined by interactions between risk premia and leverage effects in the presence of leverage effects. Empirically, I find a robust negative relationship between the expected excess return and the jump volatility and a robust negative relationship between the expected excess return and the unexpected diffusion volatility. The latter provides an indirect evidence of the positive relationship between the expected excess return and the diffusion volatility.

Simulation experiments show that both partial-adjustment and debt-equity choice models can generate spuriously significant estimates that are consistent with the hypothesis that firms have target debt ratios to which they periodically adjust. Regressions relying on full-sample fixed effects models of target leverage, in particular, produce results severely biased in favor of the target-adjustment hypothesis. Various target proxies and modifications to the standard methodologies are examined to identify partial-adjustment and debt-equity choice models that have power to reject the target-adjustment hypothesis. The resulting estimates of the speed of adjustment are in the range of five-eight percent per year.

We show that new managers who take over mutual fund portfolios sell off inherited momentum losers at higher rates than stocks in any other momentum decile, even after adjusting for concurrent trades in these stocks by continuing fund managers. This behavior is observed regardless of fund characteristics and is stronger when new managers are external hires. The tendency of continuing fund managers to hold on to losers could be consistent with either a behavior bias stemming from an inability to ignore the sunk costs associated with the stocks' past underperformance or a conscious desire to protect their careers by not admitting prior mistakes. Furthermore, we present evidence that selling off loser stocks helps improve fund performance.