I find that approximately 30% of price fluctuations in the Fama-French size and value factors are nonfundamental price pressures driven by correlated fund flows, which generate price movements that revert over time. Is this really demand-based price pressure? I show that the price effects happen exclusively in periods when mutual funds place trades, a fact that is difficult to explain using traditional mechanisms such as unobserved investor preference changes. The estimated price elasticity is also consistent with other studies. Overall, my findings show that a sizable fraction of size and value factor movements do not represent economic risk.

We examine a simple measure of operating leverage: the ratio of fixed costs (measured by depreciation and amortization plus selling, general, and administrative expenses) to the market (or book) value of assets. We find that this measure of operating leverage positively predicts returns. This operating leverage measure is not explained by common factors and performs better than the traditional measures of operating leverage. Furthermore, an exploratory two-factor model with the operating leverage factor works at least as well as, but does not subsume, the Fama and French five-factor model.

We provide novel evidence that arbitrageurs use exchange-traded funds (ETFs) as an avenue to circumvent short-sale constraints at the stock level. Using a large sample of U.S. equity ETF holdings, we document that shorting activity on ETFs rises with the difficulty of shorting underlying stocks. Stocks heavily shorted via their holding ETFs underperform those that are lightly shorted. The return predictability of ETF shorting is distinct from stock-level shorting measures and is concentrated among stocks that face severe arbitrage constraints. These findings suggest that ETFs allow arbitrageurs to target overpriced stocks that are otherwise difficult to short.

Corporate bond prices are slow to respond to default risk and interest rate shocks, as proxied by firm-level stock returns and Treasury returns, respectively. Furthermore, the underreaction is risk-specific: bonds with better credit quality underreact more to default risk, while those with worse quality underreact more to interest rates. The underreactions imply substantial out-of-sample return predictability, and investors appear to be leaving too much money on the table. The results are consistent with behavioral inattention models in which investors endogenously allocate more attention to payoff-relevant (or salient) risks, and they are not explained by traditional trading friction mechanisms.

We study the role of social networks in hedge fund activism. Actively managed funds whose managers are socially connected to activists are more likely than unconnected managers to invest in target stocks; their investment decisions are profitable. Importantly, such effects are greater for funds facing more severe information asymmetry. Connected funds are 14.2 percentage points more likely to support activists in proxy contests and contribute to reducing proxy contest costs. Our evidence shows that social ties benefit both connected investors and activists, and suggests that social networks reduce information asymmetry around activist campaigns by facilitating information exchange and increasing trust.

This study investigates the relationship between internet penetration and venture capital (VC) investment in China. Exploiting staggered inclusion in demonstration cities under the Broadband China strategy as a positive shock to internet penetration, our difference-in-differences analysis shows that this policy shock results in an increase in VC investments in demonstration cities relative to others. Moreover, the increase in VC investments is concentrated in early stage financing and young start-ups. In terms of VC fund sources, we find a stronger effect on foreign and independent VCs. Our mechanism analysis suggests that the effect of the broadband rollout is mainly driven by cities with higher ex-ante costs of information acquisition and that such costs are reduced by the improvement of internet-based network infrastructure. Finally, we provide additional evidence on the benefits to established companies by showing that broadband rollout improves the information environment of listed firms. Our study sheds new light on the economic consequences of infrastructure development that reduces information acquisition costs in China.

This paper investigates the effects of regulatory interventions on contracting relationships within firms by examining the impacts of the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act on CEO compensation. Using panel data of the S&P 1500 firms, it quantifies welfare gains from a principal–agent model with hidden information and hidden actions. It finds that SOX: (1) reduced the conflict of interest between shareholders and their CEOs, mainly by reducing shareholder loss from CEOs deviating from their goal of expected value maximization; (2) increased the cost of agency, or the risk premium CEOs are paid to align their interests with those of shareholders; (3) increased administrative costs in the primary sector (which includes utilities and energy) but the effect in the other two broadly defined sectors, services and consumer goods, was more nuanced; and (4) had no effect on the attitude of CEOs toward risk.

The systemic risk and negative social impacts from bank-issued wealth management products (WMPs) are well studied by scholars and practitioners in China. Using hand-collected bank data, we find that WMPs help reduce banks’ cost of funds, which is then passed on to their borrowers as lower borrowing cost. This finding shows an upside of this controversial but increasingly popular bank product. We propose four mechanisms through which WMPs can lower banks’ cost of funds: structural change in deposits, cross-subsidization, liquidity effect, and related-party transactions. We find supporting evidence for those mechanisms, and their effects vary across state-owned, joint-stock, and city commercial banks. Those variations are consistent with the unique characteristics of each bank group. We further explore the competition for capital between state-owned and non-state-owned banks. The results suggest that state-owned banks offer significantly higher interest rates for deposits as non-state-owned banks expand in the same region. WMP issuance is likely a differentiation strategy in response to the competition for deposits.

Using a difference-in-differences approach that relies on the exogenous increase in options trading activity generated by the Securities and Exchange Commission's Penny Pilot Program, we find a negative causal effect of options trading on earnings management. With a reduced magnitude of discretionary accruals, the pilot firms are less likely to marginally beat earnings targets and less likely to have financial misstatements during the pilot period. Cross-sectional analysis shows that the effects are more pronounced among firms with a small or less independent board or a small audit committee. Furthermore, the pilot firms receive more market attention, and their stock price efficiency improves more than the nonpilot firms during the pilot period. The evidence is consistent with the argument that active options trading enhances market scrutiny of firms' reporting behavior, improving financial reporting quality and price efficiency.