During a financial crisis, when investors are most in need of liquidity and accurate prices, hedge funds cut their arbitrage positions and hoard cash. The paper explains this phenomenon. We argue that the fragile nature of the capital structure of hedge funds, combined with low market liquidity, creates a risk of coordination in redemptions among hedge fund investors that severely limits hedge funds' arbitrage capabilities. We present a model of hedge funds' optimal asset allocation in the presence of coordination risk among investors. We show that hedge fund managers behave conservatively and even abstain from participating in the market once coordination risk is factored into their investment decisions. The model suggests a new source of limits to arbitrage.

We study dynamic incentives and behaviour in markets with costly discovery of past transactions. In our model, a sequence of short-lived customers interact over time with a single long-lived firm that privately knows its type (good or opportunistic). Customers must pay to observe the firm's past behaviour. We characterize the equilibrium structure that features accumulation, consumption, and restoration of reputation. The opportunistic firm deliberately builds its reputation up to a point where the maximum periods of information acquired by customers do not reveal past opportunistic behaviour and exploits the customers who most trust the firm.

[We examine how managerial incentives affect acquisition decisions in the banking industry. We find that higher pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) leads to value-enhancing acquisitions. Banks whose CEOs have higher PPS have significantly better abnormal stock returns around the time of the acquisition announcements. On average, acquirers in the high-PPS group outperform their counterparts in the low-PPS group by 1.4% in a three-day window around the announcement. Higher PPS helps reduce the incentives for making value-destroying acquisitions, while at the same time promotes value-enhancing acquisitions. The positive market reaction can be rationalized by post-merger performance. Following acquisitions, banks with higher PPS experience greater improvements in their operating performance. We show that the effect of PPS is mainly evident in small and medium-sized banks, but is not present in large banks.]

Regulation G requires all companies to quantitatively reconcile pro forma earnings with GAAP earnings. This paper provides three findings related to the impact of reconciliations on mispricing of pro forma earnings. First, prior to Reg G, we find that mispricing of pro forma earnings is limited to firms with low reconciliation quality. There is no evidence of mispricing for firms with high reconciliation quality. Second, we find no evidence of mispricing after Reg G. Third, there is a cross-Reg G reduction of mispricing for firms whose reconciliation quality improves, and there continues to be no mispricing for firms that have high reconciliation quality both before and after Reg G. Together, our results support the notion that better reconciliations reduce the extent of mispricing.

Existing theories advocate the exclusive use of equity-like instruments in executive compensation. However, recent empirical studies document the prevalence of debt-like instruments such as pensions. This paper justifies the use of debt as efficient compensation. Inside debt is a superior solution to the agency costs of debt than the solvency-contingent bonuses and salaries proposed by prior literature, since its payoff depends not only on the incidence of bankruptcy but also firm value in bankruptcy. Contrary to intuition, granting the manager equal proportions of debt and equity is typically inefficient. In most cases, an equity bias is desired to induce effort. However, if effort is productive in increasing liquidation value, or if bankruptcy is likely, a debt bias can improve effort as well as alleviate the agency costs of debt. The model generates a number of empirical predictions consistent with recent evidence.

Using stock returns around recommendation changes to measure the information produced by analysts, I find that analysts produce more firm-specific than industry-level information. Analysts produce more firm-specific information on stocks with higher idiosyncratic return volatilities. The amount of industry information produced by analysts increases with the absolute value of the stock’s industry beta and decreases with the stock’s idiosyncratic volatility. Other stocks in the industry also respond to the recommendation change, and the magnitude of the response increases with the absolute value of the industry beta of the recommended stock and that of other stocks in the industry. I also offer results on how investors may use analyst research more effectively and potentially improve their investment performance.

We assess the impact of institutions on Chinese firms’ corporate investment in an investment Euler equation framework. We allow the variables measuring institutions to affect the rate at which firm managers discount future investment payoffs. Applying generalized method of moments estimators to large samples of Chinese firms, we estimate the stochastic discount rates derived from actual investment and examine how they vary across institutional variables. We document robust evidence that ownership is the primary institutional factor affecting corporate investment in China. The derived discount rate for a nonstate firm is approximately 10 percentage points higher than that of an otherwise equal state firm. State firms tend to use higher discount rates to invest after they are partially privatized. We also find that firms with higher levels of corporate governance use higher discount rates to make investment.

We develop a theory of initial public offering (IPO) underpricing based on differentiated underwriting services and localized competition. Even though a large number of investment banks compete for IPOs, if issuers care about non-price dimensions of underwriting, then the industry structure is best characterized as a series of local oligopolies. We test our model implications on all-star analyst coverage, industry expertise, and other non-price dimensions. Furthermore, we posit that venture capitalists (VCs) are especially focused on all-star analyst coverage, and develop the analyst lust theory of the underpricing of VC-backed IPOs. Consistent with this theory, we find that VC-backed IPOs are much more underpriced when they have coverage from an all-star analyst.

We investigate the relation between price informativeness and idiosyncratic return volatility in a multi-asset, multi-period noisy rational expectations equilibrium. We show that the relation between price informativeness and idiosyncratic return volatility is either U-shaped or negative. Using several price informativeness measures, we empirically document a U-shaped relation between price informativeness and idiosyncratic return volatility. Our study therefore reconciles the opposing views in the following two strands of literature: (1) the growing body of research showing that firms with more informative stock prices have greater idiosyncratic return volatility, and (2) the studies arguing that more information in price reduces idiosyncratic return volatility.

We analyze a firm's choice between spin-offs, equity carve-outs, and tracking stock issues and the role of institutional investors in corporate restructuring. We model a firm with two divisions. Insiders have private information about firm value and face an equity market with retail and institutional investors. We show that restructuring increases information production by institutional investors (relative to that about the consolidated firm): the highest increase in information production arises from spin-offs, the next highest from carve-outs, and the lowest from tracking stock issues. Insiders with the most favorable private information implement spin-offs; those with less favorable private information implement carve-outs; those with even less favorable private information implement tracking stock issues; and those with unfavorable private information remain consolidated. We explain the positive announcement effect and increase in analyst coverage associated with all three forms of restructuring. Our model also generates a number of novel testable predictions for firms' choice between spin-offs, carve-outs, and tracking stock issues, and for institutional trading around these three forms of restructuring.